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ABSTRACT
We should no longer expect the Alien Tort Statute to be the principal
federal statute that deters overseas corporate rights violations. That
distinction rightly belongs to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, an antibribery statute that rests on undisputed principles of corporate liability,
contains a clear congressional statement of extraterritorial application,
and routinely collects penalties from multinational corporate defendants.
Scholars have not associated the FCPA with human rights, owing
principally to a thin understanding of rights theory. But freedom from
corruption can and should be understood as a human right, one that is as
old as social contract theory but new to federal and international law.
With specific reforms—one modeled after environmental law and the other
after intellectual property—the FCPA can become a more powerful
statutory tool for deterring overseas corporate rights violations than the
ATS ever was or will be.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court is thought to have dealt a near-fatal blow to the
doctrine of corporate liability for overseas human rights violations. Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.1 limited the extraterritorial application of
the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) almost to the point of nonexistence.
Because the ATS is (or was) widely regarded as the sole provision of the
U.S. Code holding corporations liable for overseas rights abuses, we
assume the doctrine now lies on its deathbed.
But the ATS may not have been particularly well-suited to protect
human rights from overseas corporate intrusions. The 225-year-old, one-

1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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sentence statute contains no express grant of extraterritorial application.2
Neither does it provide for the liability of corporations.3 And its capacity
to deter violations has been greatly hampered by the near impossibility of
collecting corporate judgments.4 As the cornerstone of a federal statutory
regime, the ATS was rather precarious. Perhaps we should not be
surprised to now bemoan its fate.
What the world needs now is a federal statute that holds both U.S. and
foreign companies liable for overseas human rights abuses; a statute that
contains an express congressional statement of extraterritorial application
and rests on well-established principles of corporate liability. Ideally, the
statute would plainly provide a specific cause of action, amply supported
by an accessible legislative history. It would not have the courts
unilaterally intervening in delicate foreign affairs, but would involve the
executive branch in enforcement. And in the best of all possible worlds, its
settlements would be consistently won and collected, inducing an
international culture of compliance. What we need, in other words, is a
statute that does the work the ATS never could and, after Kiobel, likely
never will.
That statute already exists. It is the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”), which criminalizes the bribery of overseas officials for
business purposes.5 Congress originally enacted this statute in 1977
specifically to promote democratic values across the world through
international business.6 The FCPA recently accounted for half of all
criminal penalties collected by the U.S. Department of Justice.7 Indeed,
that agency has publicly stated that after fighting terrorism, combating
overseas corporate bribery is its first priority.8
2. The full text of the ATS reads, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For a discussion of extraterritoriality, see, e.g., Austen L. Parrish,
Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815 (2009) (discussing the
debate).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
4. See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2012) (reviewing the challenges ATS plaintiffs face in
collecting judgments against corporate defendants).
5. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3 (2012).
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Secures More than $2 Billion in
Judgments and Settlements as a Result of Enforcement Actions Led by the Criminal Division (Jan. 21,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-crm-085.html.
8. Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition
Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 247, 249–50 (2010).
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Still, anti-bribery law is not generally thought of in relation to the
broader movement to hold corporations accountable for human rights
violations, for two reasons. The first is an impoverished understanding of
rights. While we may consider corruption to be a means of violating
human rights, we do not generally regard it as an inherent rights violation.9
Secondly, we enforce, and regard, overseas corporate bribery as essentially
an issue of white-collar crime. This owes to a historical accident whereby
Congress codified the bribery prohibition as an amendment to the 1934
Exchange Act, vesting enforcement authority with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.10 We thus enforce a prohibition on corrupting
foreign governments as if that conduct were really no different than
domestic insider trading or market manipulation.
But history is proving circular, and we must now rediscover that which
we once understood all too well. Corruption does indeed violate a human
right: the right to a liberty that can be realized only in civil society, where
the government confers benefits in accordance with standing laws,
common to everyone, and directed to the public good.11 In Lockean
political theory, it is the right to not be under “the arbitrary will of
another.”12 The violation of this right voids the social contract, destroys
civil society, and returns humankind to the state of nature. Indeed, Locke
claimed that abusing public office for private gain was the very definition
of tyranny.13
So too is corporate bribery closely associated with other rights already
recognized in international law: the right to equal protection, to political
representation, to self-determination, to food, housing, and medical care,
to education, to equal access to a country’s public services, to safe
working conditions, to control natural resources, and indeed to the very
rule of law itself.14 Corruption, properly defined, is the source from which
so many other violations spring.
The starting point for reframing federal corruption policy lies in a
recent policy paper of the Obama Administration. In 2010, the
Administration publicly claimed that “corruption is a violation of basic

9.
10.
11.
12.
1986).
13.
14.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 34 (Prometheus Books ed.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
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human rights.”15 The paper was both underpublicized, and undertheorized;
it did little to promote or defend this assertion. But when subjected to a
rigorous philosophical defense, this executive statement of foreign policy
can begin to fill the void that the judicial branch’s Kiobel decision has
created.
Meanwhile, the catalyst for a broad public debate on anti-bribery
policy lies in a now-pending FCPA enforcement action that should prove
the highest-profile in history: Wal-Mart, perhaps the most infamous U.S.based multinational corporation, is under investigation for systematically
paying bribes across the developing world, inducing violations of various
long-recognized rights.16 With the convergence of these forces, now is the
time to reconceptualize corporate bribery as an issue of human rights.
This Article undertakes that project, making three claims. First,
corruption generally, and bribery specifically, can and must be regarded as
violating a human right. Second, once the FCPA is understood as a human
rights statute, it provides a far more effective model for deterring overseas
rights abuses by corporations than the ATS ever did, or could. Third, with
two specific reforms modeled after other areas of federal law, we could
more fully achieve the FCPA’s purpose of promoting human rights
through international business.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I demonstrates that the FCPA
was, at its inception, understood as a statute for promoting democratic
values in developing countries through ethical commerce. It then provides
empirical data which show that enforcement now creates the conditions in
which bribery proliferates: enforcement deters investment in countries
perceived to be corrupt, leaving a foreign direct investment void which is
filled by aggressive bribe-payors from nondemocratic jurisdictions. I have
previously called this dynamic the sanctioning effect of anti-bribery law.17
Part II first provides a new definition of corruption that is suitable to the
era of anti-bribery enforcement, then demonstrates that corruption,
properly defined, can and indeed must be regarded as violating a right.
Having reframed bribery as a human rights issue, Part III explains how the
FCPA provides a far surer foundation on which to build a federal statutory
regime of corporate liability for overseas rights violations than the ATS

15. THE WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 38 (2010), available at http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf [hereinafter OBAMA REPORT].
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: U.S. Progressivism
and China’s New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 354 (2011); Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting
Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions against Emerging Markets,
62 FLA. L. REV. 351 (2010).
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ever could. It proposes two specific reforms, the first based on
environmental law and the second on intellectual property law, to more
fully achieve anti-bribery’s original purpose. Corporate liability for human
rights violations is thus a legal principle that must lose its life to find it:
with its imminent death in the ATS, it can find new life in the FCPA.I.
Anti-Bribery’s Paradox: The Foreign Policy Problem with a White-Collar
Crime Solution
At its inception, Congress understood the FCPA as an instrument for
promoting democratic values in developing countries. As this Part will
show, that vision was deeply shaped by the historical context of the Cold
War. But with the collapse of Soviet Union, we ceased to see the world
through that lens, and the foreign policy implications of anti-bribery law
gradually grew obscure. The goal of promoting democracy would be
displaced with “leveling the playing field,” a metaphor that pervades
congressional testimony of the 1980s and 90s18 and popular commentary
of the last decade.19 The metaphor goes only to the FCPA’s anticompetitive effects on U.S. companies, tellingly capturing the limitations
of our present anti-bribery paradigm. If business is a game and
multinational companies are the players, what then are the developing
countries in which they do business? The spectators? Or the turf? The
original understanding of anti-bribery’s aims is sorely in need of recovery.
Part I.A recounts the legislative history surrounding the FCPA’s
enactment, showing that those who testified understood the statute as an
instrument of promoting democratic values overseas. Part I.B draws on
several sources of empirical data to show that our modern white-collar
crime enforcement regime is actually causing compliant companies to
withdraw from developing countries and, moreover, leads companies from
countries that do not enforce anti-bribery laws to move in and fill the void.
Part I.C illustrates how reframing bribery as a human rights violation can
realign enforcement with the statute’s original purpose.

18. See Andrew Brady Spalding, Four Unchartered Corners of Anti-Corruption Law: In Search
of Remedies to the Sanctioning Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 661, 662.
19. See, e.g., ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM
(2010), available at http://www.uschamber.com/reports/restoring-balance-proposed-amendmentsforeign-corrupt-practices-act.
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A. The FCPA’s Original Ideal of Spreading Democracy Through
Commerce
Congressional deliberations on the need for an extraterritorial antibribery statute in the 1970s were initially precipitated by the discovery that
the Lockheed Corporation, the flagship U.S. defense contractor, had paid
bribes to government officials in Japan, the Netherlands, and Italy to win
bids.20 Each of these countries was thought critical to the growth of
democratic institutions, and revelations of corporate bribery undermined
liberalism’s credibility.
Perhaps the most sophisticated and telling explanation of international
bribery’s foreign policy implications was provided by Congressman
Stephen Solarz, a Democrat from New York. In 1976, he testified before
Congress, “It is important to look at the problem of overseas payments in
broader terms than simply a matter of economics or even morality.”21
Solarz’s view that an additional dimension to the problem of overseas
bribery existed would prove to be a universal and predominant theme in
the congressional testimony. Solarz explained that Lockheed’s payments
to Japanese officials put “‘[t]he democratic system in Japan . . . in grave
danger.’”22 Opponents within Japan of the Japanese-U.S. alliance were
handed what he called:
a terribly effective weapon to drive a wedge between two close
allies. At a time of uncertainty due to the shifting balances of power
in Asia, our strongest and most stable ally in the region [was]
undergoing unnecessary turbulence, and [a] relationship which is at
the very heart of our foreign policy [was] potentially jeopardized.23
Solarz thought the “most serious” and “delicate” situation was in Italy,
which was “one of the keys to the southern flank of NATO” and whose
government was equally split between a liberal party and the Communist

20. See WILLIAM D. HARTUNG, PROPHETS OF WAR:
THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 189, 192 (2011).

LOCKHEED MARTIN AND THE MAKING OF

21. Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin.
of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 140 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 House
Consumer Prot. Subcomm. Hearing] (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz).
22. Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 172 (1977)
[hereinafter 1977 Prot. Hearings] (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz) (quoting “a very senior
politician close to former [Japanese] Prime Minister Takeo Mike”).
23. 1976 House Consumer Prot. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 21, at 141 (statement of Rep.
Stephen J. Solarz).
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Party.24 He noted that “[a]llegations of payments by Lockheed served to
advance the Communist cause in Italy where the Communist bloc was
strengthened by the sight of corrupt capitalism.”25
Congress feared that the Communist Party could gain a majority in the
Italian parliament and the prospects for building democratic institutions
would be lost.26 The implications of corporate bribery for the U.S. effort to
promote the growth of democratic institutions were thus “staggering and
in some cases, perhaps irreversible.”27 The example of Italy demonstrated
that “[c]ommunist and other anti-U.S. forces are quick to take advantage
of any evidence of immorality or corruption associated with pro-Western
governments. Both fear and resentment are generated among foreign
officials who become increasingly hostile as the United States continues to
expose traditional corrupt practices abroad.”28 Solarz continued, “[W]hat
is at stake is much more than the individual interests of corporations which
are competing for a share of foreign markets. What is in fact at stake is the
foreign policy and national interest of the United States.”29 Ultimately,
“The resulting economic and political instability is certainly detrimental
. . . when it results in a backlash against American ideals . . . .”30
This seemingly hawkish view would actually prove non-partisan. It
was articulated with equal force by members of both the Ford and Carter
Administrations. Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser in the
Department of State under President Ford, testified that corruption
“jeopardizes the important interests we share with our friends abroad”
because it undermines a form of government “upon which social progress,
economic justice, and perhaps, ultimately, world peace depends.”31
Treasury Secretary William E. Simon further stated that it “adversely
affects our relations with foreign governments and can contribute to a
general deterioration in the climate for fair and open international trade
and investment.”32 Ford’s Commerce Secretary, Elliot L. Richardson,

24. Id.
25. 1977 Prot. Hearings, supra note 22, at 173 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz).
26. 1976 House Consumer Prot. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 21, at 141 (statement of Rep.
Stephen J. Solarz).
27. Id. at 2 (statement of John M. Murphy, Chairman).
28. 1977 Prot. Hearings, supra note 22, at 173 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 23–24 (1975)
(statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State).
32. Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 85 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Banking Hearings] (statement of
William E. Simon, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury).
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further articulated: “Bribery . . . threatens to poison relationships between
the United States and nations with which we have long had mutually
beneficial political and commercial ties.”33 Ultimately, President Ford
would formally state that reports of bribery “tend to destroy confidence” in
liberal-democratic institutions.34 When the Carter Administration moved
in, his Treasury Secretary stated, “The Carter Administration believes that
it is damaging both to our country and to a healthy world economic system
for American corporations to bribe foreign officials.”35 President Carter
ultimately explained in his signing statement that “[c]orrupt practices
between corporations and public officials overseas undermine the integrity
and stability of governments and harm our relations with other countries.
Recent revelations of widespread overseas bribery have eroded public
confidence in our basic institutions.”36
This view was expressed most forcefully by Democrat George Ball,
who had become famous as a member of the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations for his opposition to the Vietnam War. Ball explained:
The vast volume of speeches, pamphlets, and advertising copy and
propaganda leaflets extolling the virtues of free enterprise are
cancelled every night when managements demonstrate by their
conduct that a sector of multinational business activity is not free; it
is bought and paid for. This is a problem that, like so many others,
has relevance in the struggle of antagonistic ideologies; for, when
our enterprises stoop to bribery and kickbacks, they give substance
to the communist myth—already widely believed in Third World
countries—that capitalism is fundamentally corrupt.37
Thus, even the most liberal, reform-minded advocates recognized the
urgent foreign policy implications of international corporate bribery.
Whether we sought to promote democracy overseas out of concern for
those countries, or merely to advance our strategic interests, is of course
debatable. But that is a question as to why we should promote democracy

33. Id. at 76.
34. FOREIGN PAYMENT DISCLOSURE, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
URGING ENACTMENT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE THE DISCLOSURE OF PAYMENTS TO
FOREIGN OFFICIALS, H.R. DOC NO. 94-572, at 1 (1976).
35. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 67 (1977) at 67 (statement
of W. Michael Blumenthal, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury).
36. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill: Statement on Signing S. 305 into
Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1909, 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977).
37. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 32, at 41–42 (statement of George Ball, Lehman
Bros.).
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through commerce, not whether we should do so. And though Congress
then used the language of democracy rather than of human rights, the
meaning is essentially the same. With the integration of these themes into
both the Senate38 and House39 Reports, the bipartisan consensus
concerning the FCPA’s intended effect becomes clear.
But Congress ultimately entrusted enforcement authority to an agency
that publicly admitted it lacked the foreign policy savvy necessary to
effectively enforce a bribery prohibition. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) stated that overseas corporate bribery
was a question beyond the scope of the SEC’s authority and
expertise because it “presents a broad issue of national policy with
important implications for international trade and commerce, the
appropriateness of application of United States law to transactions
by United States citizens in foreign countries, and the possible
impact of such legislation upon the foreign relations of the United
States.”40
Professor Barbara Black has recently documented in impressive detail the
awkwardness of this arrangement as felt by the SEC itself.41 Reading the
legislative history, she notes that while the SEC was quite willing to
accept enforcement responsibility for the books and records provisions of
the FCPA,42 the SEC was not interested in enforcing the anti-bribery
provisions and, in fact, “expressed no views on ‘whether there should be a
general statutory prohibition against the making of certain kinds of foreign
payments.’”43 Then-Chairman of the SEC, Roderick Hills, testified before
Congress that the SEC would “prefer not to be involved” in enforcing a
bribery prohibition because it would “embody separate distinct policies
from those underlying the federal securities laws” and this policy “does
not easily fit within the [SEC’s] mandate.”44

38. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977).
39. H. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
40. Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption
Is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1098 (2012).
41. Id. (quoting U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, U.S. Senate
157 (94th Sess., 2d Sess.) (May 1976) at 61-62 [hereinafter SEC REPORT]).
42. In addition to the anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA includes books and records and internal
control provisions designed to prevent accounting and governance lapses.
43. Black, supra note 40, at 1098 (quoting SEC REPORT, supra note 41, at 61).
44. Id. at 1098–99 (quoting Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Inv.
Disclosure: Hearing on S.305 Before the Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong.
124–25 (1977) (statement of Roderick Hills, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n)). See also id. at 1099
n.22 (“we do not seek nor entirely wish to have the responsibility for stopping these kinds of
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The SEC fully appreciated that international bribery was, first and
foremost, a question of foreign policy that a white-collar crime agency is
ill-equipped to handle. Given the incongruence between the statute’s goals
and its implementation, we should not be surprised to find the modern
FCPA missile getting sideways.
B. Empirical Evidence that Modern Enforcement Harms Developing
Countries
Empirical data from multiple sources demonstrate that anti-bribery
enforcement causes companies subject to FCPA jurisdiction to withdraw
their capital from developing countries. This, in turn, creates the very
conditions in which bribery proliferates and illiberal regimes gain
influence.
Two sets of economic studies have demonstrated that anti-bribery
enforcement causes corporations subject to its jurisdiction to do less
business in bribery-prone markets. The first, in 1995 by James Hines,
focused on the impact of the FCPA alone, finding that, controlling for
other variables, FCPA enforcement caused a reduction in business in
bribery-prone countries.45 To clarify, the thesis is not that U.S. companies
were investing less overall in developing countries in 1995 than they were
in 1976—indeed, such a conclusion would be absurd and patently
unsupportable. Rather, the finding was that companies did less business in
such countries than they would have if the FCPA did not exist. This initial
study further found that total investment in bribery-prone countries did not
drop; rather, U.S. investment was replaced by investment from countries
without bribery prohibitions, a process termed “ownership substitution.”46
A second set of studies conducted after enactment of the OECD
Convention Against Bribery confirmed the finding that as anti-bribery
legislation became more prevalent, bribery-prone countries received less
of their foreign direct investment (FDI) from OECD nations and more
from nations without bribery prohibitions.47 Professor Alvaro Cuervo-

payments.”); Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929,
961–69 (2012).
45. James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w5266.pdf.
46. Id. at 20.
47. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares about Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 807, 818
(2006).
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Cazurra essentially confirmed and expanded upon Hines’ thesis.48 CuervoCazurra’s study was narrower than Hines’ in that he focused exclusively
on FDI, but broader in that Cuervo-Cazurra used data on bilateral FDI
inflows from 183 home economies to 106 host economies with varying
quantified corruption levels.49
Cuervo-Cazurra further found that the phenomenon of businesses from
countries with anti-bribery legislation investing less in highly corrupt
countries was not limited to the United States. Rather, high levels of
corruption in a host country generally resulted in less FDI from signatories
to the OECD convention.50 The same phenomenon that Hines identified
with respect to the United States thus became more widespread as a result
of the OECD convention. The underside of the phenomenon that Hines
first identified—countries that are not bound by anti-bribery legislation
continue to invest in corrupt countries—was likewise confirmed by
Cuervo-Cazurra. Post-OECD, as signatory countries invested less in
corrupt countries, countries with higher levels of corruption received
relatively more FDI from countries with similarly higher corruption
levels.51 The result of these trends is that as anti-bribery legislation became
more widespread, corrupt countries received less of their FDI from lesscorrupt countries and more of their FDI from more-corrupt countries.52
In a second empirical study,53 Cuervo-Cazurra verified and restated his
finding that countries which implemented the OECD Convention had
become “more sensitive” to corruption and had reduced their FDI in morecorrupt countries.54 He then proposed a modification of Hines’ original
thesis, concluding that prior to the OECD convention, U.S. investors were

48. Id. at 814. Cuervo-Cazurra further noted that Hines’ study had become subject to various
methodological disputes, as noted in Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing is Corruption on International
Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2000). Cuervo-Cazurra believed that he had improved upon
Hines’ methodology and yet confirmed the results. See Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 47, at 808–09.
Evaluating these methodologies is not the purpose of this Article. For further empirical studies
confirming FCPA enforcement’s negative impact on FDI, see also Paul J. Beck et al., The Impact of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on US Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 295, 300
(1991); Rajib Sanyal and Subarna Samanta, Effect of Perception of Corruption on Outward U.S.
Foreign Direct Investment, 10 GLOBAL BUS. & ECON. REV. 123, 137 (2008); OHANN GRAF
LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE
AND POLICY 174 (2007); Anna D’Souza, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the Currents
of Trade, 97 J. DEV. ECON. 73, 79 (2012).
49. Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 47, at 811.
50. Id. at 807–08.
51. Id. at 808.
52. Id.
53. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 39 J. INT’L BUS.
STUD. 634 (2008).
54. Id. at 644.
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not in fact investing less in corrupt countries, but that they began investing
less after OECD ratification.55 In other words, the FCPA standing alone
did not induce U.S. investors to invest less in corrupt countries, but rather
the OECD induced both U.S. and other OECD signatories to invest less.56
We may be surprised to discover that for a period, the U.S. government
formally adopted and publicly embraced this very position: that FCPA
enforcement reduced U.S. investment in developing countries. After the
FCPA’s enactment in 1977, the U.S. government began lobbying the
western world to enact a similar prohibition, ultimately succeeding in 1997
with the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.57 In the testimony
before Congress, a common theme was that the U.S. business community
was losing business overseas as a result of the FCPA. In his message
transmitting the Convention, President Bill Clinton noted that the United
States “ha[d] been alone” in criminalizing overseas bribery and that
“United States corporations have contended that this has put them at a
significant disadvantage in competing for international contracts with
respect to foreign competitors who are not subject to such laws.”58
Numerous congressmen testified that the Convention would “level[] the
playing field,”59 as did SEC Associate Director Paul Gerlach.60 Ultimately,
President Clinton would adopt this metaphor in his signing statement.61
Moreover, the Clinton Administration calculated a very specific estimate
of the amount of business that U.S. corporations were losing. President
Clinton indicated in his signing statement that the value of the contracts
lost to U.S. businesses each year as a result of the FCPA was $30 billion.62
An Undersecretary of State and the General Counsel of the Office of the
Secretary of Commerce63 encompassed the same figure in their testimony.

55. Id. at 645.
56. See also D’Souza, supra note 48.
57. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).
58. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, at III (1998).
59. See, e.g., The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998 Hearing Before
the Finance and Hazardous Materials Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 1
(1998) [hereinafter 1998 House Finance Hearing] (statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous Materials); id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Tom Bliley, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Commerce).
60. Id. at 11 (statement of Paul V. Gerlach, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n).
61. Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 2
PUB. PAPERS 2011 (Nov. 10, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Presidential Signing Statement].
62. Id.
63. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 59, at 6 (statement of Andrew J. Pincus, General
Counsel to the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce).
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The argument proved persuasive and the U.S. joined the OECD
Convention.
But the empirical studies merely confirm what common sense would
teach: if we increase the costs of conducting business through the FCPA,
we will tend to do less business in corrupt countries. Indeed, this sense is
captured by the rapid accumulation of anecdotal evidence in surveys and
congressional testimony. A 2009 Dow Jones Risk Compliance survey,
announced in a press release entitled, “Amid Confusion About Anticorruption Laws, Companies Abandon Expansion Initiatives,” found that
51% of companies had delayed a business initiative as a result of the
FCPA and 14% had abandoned an initiative altogether.64 More recently, a
2011 survey by the accounting firm KPMG found that among executives
surveyed in the United States and the United Kingdom, “more than 70%
. . . agreed there are places in the world where business cannot be done
without engaging in bribery and corruption.” Approximately 30% of the
respondents indicated that they deal with this risk by not doing business in
certain countries.65
This capital withdrawal, and other countries’ exploitation of it, recently
reappeared in congressional testimony. During the June 2011 hearing on
amending the FCPA, attorney George Terwilliger noted that while we are
realizing the goal of heightened compliance with anti-bribery provisions:
[T]here is another less desirable effect . . . when companies forgo
business opportunity out of concern for FCPA compliance risk. This
hurts the creation of [U.S.] jobs and the ability of U.S. companies to
compete with companies elsewhere that do not have to concern
themselves with uncertainties of the terms and requirements of the
FCPA. . . .
[T]here is hidden cost borne of the uncertainties attached to FCPA
compliance risk. . . .
[C]ompanies sometimes forgo deals they could otherwise do, take a
pass on contemplated projects, or withdraw from ongoing projects
and ventures.66

64. See Press Release, Dow Jones Risk & Compliance, Dow Jones Survey: Amid confusion
about Anti-corruption Laws, Companies Abandon Expansion Initiatives (Dec. 9, 2009), available at
http://fis.dowjones.com/risk/09survey.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
65. Mike Koehler, Survey Says. . ., FCPA PROFESSOR (June 2, 2011, 5:25 AM), http://fcpa
professor.blogspot.com/2011/06/survey-says.html (quoting KPMG, GLOBAL ANTI-BRIBERY AND
CORRUPTION SURVEY 2011, at 18 (2011)).
66. Testimony of George J. Terwilliger III, Esq., Partner, White & Case LLP before the House
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We have a name for this dynamic, and that name is not flattering. The
label we generally attach to the government-induced withdrawal of capital
from developing countries in protest of their political conditions is
“economic sanctions.” The broader project of which this paper is a part
analyzes the “sanctioning effect” of anti-bribery law.67 Economic
sanctions literature teaches that when some part of the world sanctions a
given country, a capital void is created. Because the sanctioned country
still needs that capital (i.e., FDI) to stimulate its economic growth, it will
look to countries not participating in the sanctions to fill the void. These
latter countries are sometimes called “black knights”—they rescue the
sanctioned country, but through nefarious means.68
Anti-corruption law is today creating a similar sanctioning effect, as
the empirical evidence above concerning “ownership substitution” and the
survey data both demonstrate. The principal black knight in the antibribery space is China—a country with ample capital, an aggressive
foreign and economic policy, and a near-complete absence of
extraterritorial anti-corruption enforcement.69 When companies subject to
U.S. jurisdiction find the risk of a bribery violation too high, and they
withdraw from a project, or a sector, or a country, and the resulting FDI
void is frequently filled by Chinese or other “black knight” companies
who may engage in bribery without fear of penalty. The net result is that
although U.S. corporations (or foreign corporations subject to U.S.
jurisdiction) are committing bribery less often, the overall amount of
bribery occurring in developing countries can actually increase. Although
the proliferation of FCPA compliance practices among U.S. law firms
suggests the FCPA has deterred bribery among companies subject to its
jurisdiction,70 it has simultaneously done something else altogether: it has
created the very conditions in which corruption proliferates.
But we can fix this problem, as the next Part begins to describe.

Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Hearing on The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, WHITE & CASE, LLP., available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/
Publication/c6278e72-532d-4e06-9560-399f13e044e2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5c6562132a02-4bf0-ba94-42caf31a7218/alert_George_Terwilliger_Testify_FCPA_Reform.pdf.
67. See Spalding, Irony of International Business Law, supra note 17; Spalding, Four
Unchartered Corners, supra note 18; Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 17. Portions of Parts
I.A. and I.B. have been adapted from material that previously appeared in one or more of those papers.
68. See Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 17, at 397.
69. See Spalding, Irony of International Business Law, supra note 17, at 360–61.
70. Jordan Weissmann, The Corruption Law That Scares the Bejeesus Out of Corporate
America, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2012/04/the-corruption-law-that-scares-the-bejesus-out-of-corporate-america/256314/; see also Joe
Palazzollo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10000872396390443862604578028462294611352.
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C. How a Rights Paradigm Resolves the Paradox
An alternative enforcement regime would focus on promoting liberaldemocratic values and institutions through ethical commerce, just as those
who testified before Congress originally imagined. Or, put another way, it
would seek to actually improve the conditions of the citizens in countries
where U.S. companies do business.
A new regime could accomplish this through an approach with two
prongs, neither of which is currently practiced to a meaningful degree nor
lies within the white-collar-crime paradigm. The first prong would involve
preventing the black knights from filling the capital void left by
withdrawing companies. To achieve this goal, the black knights must
become subject to meaningfully enforced anti-bribery laws. While the
FCPA’s jurisdictional scope is indeed broad, it is also limited; true global
enforcement requires the world’s principal capital-exporting nations to
adopt and enforce their own extraterritorial bribery prohibitions. If all
multinational companies were subject to such laws, there would be no
black knights, no ownership substitution, and FCPA enforcement would
not cause foreign bribery to proliferate. The second prong would directly
address the damage done by corporate bribery in the communities in
which the bribery occurred. That is, our enforcement agencies could use
FCPA enforcement to remedy the harms of large-scale corporate bribery
and improve the political cultures and institutions in developing countries.
The seeds of a radical rethinking of anti-bribery policy lie in the
Obama Administration’s recent policy pronouncement. The 2010 National
Security Strategy 71 outlines a set of ways to “Promote Democracy and
Human Rights Abroad.”72 Among them is “Strengthening International
Norms Against Corruption.”73 There, the President announced “that
pervasive corruption is a violation of basic human rights.”74 The report
explains that the Administration is working with other organizations, such
as the United Nations, G-20, OECD, and international financial
institutions, to protect this right, and it provides a number of more specific
tactics for promoting transparency in transactions within and between
institutions.75

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See OBAMA REPORT, supra note 15.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
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Though in hushed tones, the report in effect announces that as a matter
of official policy, freedom from corruption is a new universal human right.
The potential impact of this paradigm shift is vast. In the bribery context
specifically, this is best illustrated in two case studies. The first, the 2008
Siemens case, is certainly the highest-profile enforcement action in FCPA
history; the second, the now-pending Wal-Mart investigation, is likely to
displace it.
Siemens’ systematic bribery in multiple sectors across the developing
world violated an assortment of widely-recognized human rights. But the
government’s filings are remarkably silent on the issue of overseas impact.
These filings are instead written in what we might call the discourse of
white-collar crime. Siemens, a Germany-based manufacturer of industrial
and consumer products,76 is the quintessential multinational corporation.
After World War II had destroyed much of its business,77 Siemens began
building a multinational operation that now consists of over 1800 legal
entities with 400,000 employees in 190 countries.78 In 2001, it listed
American Depository Shares on the New York Stock Exchange, thus
becoming an “issuer” for purposes of the FCPA and triggering its
jurisdiction.79 Siemens may now regret that decision; it ultimately paid a
total of $1.6 billion in fines, penalties, and disgorgement of profits, the
largest settlement in FCPA history.80 The SEC alleged that between 2001
and 2007 the conglomerate made at least 4200 payments, totaling over
$1.4 billion, to bribe government officials around the world in return for
business.81
As the government’s pleadings described in detail, Siemens’ bribery
scheme would corrupt various sectors of society in numerous countries.
Regarding infrastructure, arguably the most critical sector to a developing
country’s growth, Siemens and its subsidiaries paid Chinese officials $22
million to fraudulently obtain contracts for rail construction82 and $25

76. Siemens builds including locomotives, traffic control systems, and electrical power plants, as
well as building control systems, medical equipment and electrical components. See Complaint at 3,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 08 Civ. 02167) [hereinafter
“SEC Complaint”].
77. Id. at 8–9.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id. at 4.
80. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec.
15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html [hereinafter
“DOJ Press Release”].
81. SEC Complaint, supra note 76, at 2.
82. Id. at 16–17.
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million to construct high-voltage transmission lines;83 $17 million in
Venezuela for more railway contracts;84 $800,000 for the construction of
traffic control systems in Russia;85 $20 million in Israel for contracts to
build and service power plants;86 $2.6 million in connection with refinery
projects in Mexico;87 $5 million for a contract to install mobile telephone
services in Bangladesh;”88 and $12 million in connection with
telecommunications in projects in Nigeria, where Siemens’ bribery
practices were allegedly “long-standing and systematic.”89 In the health
care sector, Siemens paid $14 million in connection with the sale of
medical equipment to state-owned hospitals;90 $55 million in connection
with the sales of medical equipment in Russia, routed through Dubai;91 in
Vietnam, a Siemens representative picked up an envelope with $183,000
left by a Hong Kong businessman in a Singapore hotel, flew to the Hanoi
airport to pass on to another Siemens representative, and used it to bribe
the Vietnamese Ministry of Health.92
But perhaps most egregious from a foreign policy perspective was
Siemens’ role in corrupting the U.N. Oil for Food Program. The program
was designed to alleviate the suffering of Iraqi citizens caused by the
economic sanctions imposed against the Hussein regime following the
Gulf War.93 The Hussein regime soon adopted a policy, enforced across
the Iraqi ministries, to require suppliers to pay government officials a ten
percent kickback on each contract.94 Foreign suppliers were instructed to
inflate their bids and purchase orders by ten percent, allowing the
suppliers to collect the money from the UN escrow account and then
redirect it to Hussein’s officials.95 The suppliers thus became middlemen,
transferring money from the sale of crude oil back into the hands of the

83. Id. at 18.
84. Id. at 28–29.
85. Id. at 25–26.
86. Id. at 17–18.
87. Id. at 26.
88. Id. at 19.
89. Id. at 29.
90. Id. at 23.
91. Id. at 27.
92. Id. at 22–23.
93. Under the program, Iraq could sell its oil and deposit the proceeds in a UN-managed escrow
account. Funds in the account would thus be used for the limited purpose of purchasing food,
medicine, and infrastructure supplies. See, e.g., Susan A. Notar, The Oil-For-Food Program and the
Need for Oversight Entities to Monitor UN Sanctions Regimes, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 163
(2007).
94. Id. at 165.
95. Id.
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officials, and thereby directly undermining the UN-imposed sanctions
regime and perpetuating Hussein’s rule. Former Federal Reserve
Chairman Paul Volcker would ultimately be asked to lead an independent
UN-commissioned committee and found that the Hussein regime had
collected $1.7 billion in bribes.96 Operating through French, Turkish, and
Middle East subsidiaries, Siemens paid kickbacks to the Hussein regime of
approximately $1.7 million.97 These bribes allowed the conglomerate to
fraudulently obtain contracts that would yield approximately $38 million
in profits.98
Siemens’ bribes across the developing world thus variously
compromised rights to medical care, to equality of access to public
services, to self-determination, to political representation, and ultimately
to the basic rule of law. But despite these manifest human rights
implications, the way in which the SEC and DOJ ultimately characterized
Siemens’ misconduct made for a sharp and telling contrast. The settlement
documents noted that Siemens created payment schemes that the
“company’s inadequate internal controls allowed to flourish.”99 Siemens
used numerous “slush funds” and “off-books accounts maintained at
unconsolidated entities.”100 Indeed, the “tone at the top” at Siemens was
“inconsistent with an effective FCPA compliance program” and “created a
corporate culture in which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the
highest levels of the company.”101 The SEC’s press release quoted an
associate director of the Enforcement Division to say, “[t]he day is past
when multi-national corporations could regard illicit payments to foreign
officials as simply another cost of doing business.”102 Similarly, the SEC’s
litigation release notes that Siemens’ Managing Board “was ineffective in
implementing controls” and in meeting the “U.S. regulatory requirements
that Siemens was subject to following its . . . listing on the New York
Stock Exchange.”103 It further explained that “[f]alse invoices and

96. PAUL A. VOLCKER ET AL., INDEP. INQUIRY COMM. INTO THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FORFOOD PROGRAMME, MANIPULATION OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME BY THE IRAQI REGIME
(2005), available at http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf.
97. SEC Complaint, supra note 76, at 29–31.
98. Id.
99. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide
Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Litigation Release 20829, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, Civil Action No. 08 CV 02167 (D.D.C.) (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.
sec.gov/litigation/ litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm.
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payment documentation was created to make payments to business
consultants under false [] agreements,” and that “illicit payments were
falsely recorded as expenses for management fees, consulting fees, supply
contracts . . . and commissions.”104 The DOJ ultimately proclaimed that its
enforcement efforts would “level the business playing field, making
it . . . fair to those who seek to participate in it.”105
This is the discourse of white-collar crime enforcement, not of human
rights. The difference, and its inherent shortcomings, are apparent in two
ways. First, the SEC and DOJ documents make virtually no mention of the
damage done to these communities. Besides cursory uses of terms like
“corruption,” the legal claims are resolved without any evident regard for
the resulting human rights abuses in Iraq, China, Russia, Venezuela,
Vietnam, and the other countries encompassed by Siemens’ bribery
scheme. Second, the notion that FCPA enforcement “levels the playing
field” makes a critical assumption about the conduct of the other “players”
in international business: that they are not paying bribes. It assumes that
the payment of bribes tips the playing field in favor of the bribe payor. But
if its competitors are paying bribes, enforcement does not make the
playing field “level.” Quite the contrary: FCPA enforcement could only
level the playing field if all companies were subject to its jurisdiction. The
settlement documents thus fail to acknowledge what occurs in these
markets when companies subject to FCPA jurisdiction begin to pull out, as
the empirical evidence indicates. Our enforcement is oblivious to the
human rights implications of anti-bribery law generally, and more
specifically, of the sanctioning effect.
The Wal-Mart enforcement action provides perhaps an optimal
opportunity to reset this paradigm. The issue exploded in the public
consciousness in April 2012 with an extensive and detailed New York
Times exposé.106 Wal-Mart’s internal investigation found evidence of tens
of millions of dollars in bribes to Mexican officials that had been
accounted for as “legal fees,” paid through local middlemen known as
“gestores.”107 The bribes allegedly enabled Wal-Mart to fraudulently
obtain zoning and environmental approvals, eliminate fines, evade taxes,

104. Id.
105. DOJ Press Release, supra note 80.
106. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at A01. Wal-Mart had disclosed as early as December 2011 that
it was subject to FCPA scrutiny. WAL-MART STORES, INC., FORM 10-Q, available at http://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/104169/000119312511335177/d233066d10q.htm (filed Dec. 8, 2011).
107. Barstow, Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up, supra note 106.
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and obtain confidential information.108 Some bribes permitted Wal-Mart to
fraudulently circumvent zoning restrictions and construct a new store
immediately adjacent to the ancient pyramids of Teotihuacan, despite the
hunger strikes and sit-ins of local community activists.109 Wal-Mart would
eventually promote the CEO of the Mexican subsidiary to vice-chairman
of the parent company due to his “outstanding results” in Mexico.110
The case has and will continue to garner widespread attention because
of the defendant: the quintessential U.S.-based multinational corporation
with an aggressive growth strategy whose practices and tactics were
already controversial. Indeed, more than half of Wal-Mart’s roughly
10,500 stores are international; it is Mexico’s largest private employer.111
But the Wal-Mart case also tees up, more perfectly than this author could
have dreamed, the larger issues of bribery’s nature and impact across the
developing world. In November 2012, Wal-Mart announced in an SEC
filing that its bribery investigation had expanded to other countries,
including but not limited to Brazil, India, and China.112 The Wal-Mart case
now presents arguably the most (in)famous U.S.-based multinational
corporation investing in the world’s flagship emerging markets and using
bribery to circumvent key regulations designed to protect human rights to
health and safety. When the eventual settlement thrusts this case back into
the public consciousness, it will create a historic opportunity to reexamine
the impact of anti-bribery enforcement on developing countries.
II. REFRAMING BRIBERY: FROM WHITE-COLLAR CRIME TO HUMAN
RIGHTS
The Obama policy announcement was as cursory as it was bold; it
made no effort to ground its assertion that corruption violates a human
right in deeper rights theory. This Part will pick up where the President
left off, by developing a philosophical justification for the principle that
corruption is properly understood as a violation of basic human rights. To
be clear, this Part will not argue that the right to be free from corruption is

108. Id.
109. David Barstow, The Bribery Aisle: How Wal-Mart Used Payoffs to Get Its Way in Mexico,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at A01.
110. Barstow, Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up, supra note 106.
111. Stephanie Clifford & David Barstow, Wal-Mart Takes a Broader Look at Bribery Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A1.
112. WAL-MART STORES, INC. FORM 8-K, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
104169/000119312512471604/d440140d8k.htm (filed Nov. 15, 2012).
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at present legally binding right under existing international covenants,113
or customary international law114 more broadly. Rather, it argues that
irrespective of what international covenants and customs now require,
anti-corruption laws generally and anti-bribery laws specifically should be
enforced as if they implicated human rights.
Part II.A will first develop a definition of corruption that is suitable to
the twenty-first century, an era in which bribery may be the quintessential
form of anti-corruption enforcement. Part II.B will then draw on the
political philosophy of John Locke to demonstrate that corruption,
properly defined, is correctly understood as violating a right. Part II.C will
then illustrate how a new rights-based paradigm for understanding
corruption would transform our understanding of large-scale corporate
bribery by considering two recent case studies.
A. Redefining Corruption for the Anti-Bribery Era
Three definitions, or approaches to defining corruption, now circulate
in corruption law discussions: I will call them the United Nations
approach, the World Bank approach, and the Black’s Law Dictionary
approach. Because none of these enables a sophisticated discussion of how
corruption law operates today, I propose a new definition.
The study of corruption is multidisciplinary, and various disciplines
have produced their definitions, each viewing the phenomenon through its

113. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter “UDHR”]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 9, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter “ICCPR”].
114. The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines international custom as “a general
practice accepted as law,” thus having two elements: 1) a general practice (meaning that most states,
(including those whose interests are specially affected, should follow the practice); that is 2) accepted
as law. See Charter of the United Nations, June 16, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter “U.N. Charter”];
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter
“I.C.J. Statute”]. The second prong is easily satisfied; virtually every jurisdiction prohibits bribery,
embezzlement, and various other forms of corruption. The critical question for a customary
international law analysis is whether that legal prohibition is satisfied by a general practice. To the
extent that this practice would consist of active enforcement, the first prong would almost certainly not
be satisfied; most of the world, especially the developing countries that would be “specially affected”
by international corruption law, devotes egregiously insufficient resources to anti-corruption
enforcement. But satisfying both prongs still would not demonstrate that corruption as a right is
customary international law and that states thus have a duty to treat corruption as rights violations. See
U.N. Charter, supra; I.C.J. Statute, supra. See also STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING
INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–46 (2006). For a discussion of whether bribery could constitute a violation
under the ATS, see Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether
Transnational Corporations are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 385 (2010).
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own lens.115 Political scientists see corruption in the abuse of state power
resulting from the absence of checks.116 Economists see corruption when
the benefit of acting contrary to duty outweighs the cost, where public
goods are sold for personal gain, or where public officials use their
monopoly to exploit economic rents.117 Sociologists will sometimes see
corruption as an absence of socially accepted norms, occurring in
countries where historical and socio-cultural conflict has resulted from
conflicting values within social groups.118
When searching for a proper legal definition, we must first clarify that
our focus must be on the noun, “corruption,” and not “corrupt” or
“corruptly”; this has proven to be far more than a grammatical distinction.
The adjective and adverb are indeed central features of criminal law,
generally describing an intent; case in point, corrupt intent is an element of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.119 And generally (though not in the
FCPA), courts have paid substantial attention to defining intent, typically
through reference to an evil purpose.120 The corruption at issue in this
Article, rather, is a more specific subset of criminal activity. Defining that
subset—legally proscribed acts that we would generally think of as
belonging in the category of “corruption”—is the task at hand.
Though I call the first definition the “United Nations approach,” it
might also be called the “Justice Potter Stewart approach.” His infamous
non-definition of obscenity—“I know it when I see it”121—may apply just
as well to corruption. And ironically (or not), this is precisely the approach
taken by what is probably the most widely-cited corruption document in

115. For an excellent survey of various disciplines’ approaches, see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata,
Corruption—A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L.
451, 453–58 (1997).
116. See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 9
(1978); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
REFORM (1999); Michael Johnston, The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment, 18
COMP. POL. 459, 464 (1986).
117. See, e.g., ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 22 (1988); Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON. 599, 599 (1993); Moisés Naím, The Corruption
Eruption, 2 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 245, 248 (1995).
118. See, e.g., Shihata, supra note 115, at 456–57. See generally Vito Tanzi, Corruption,
Governmental Activities, and Markets (Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper No. 94/99, 1994),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=883840; James C. Scott, The Analysis
of Corruption in Developing Nations, in BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
TOWARD A SEARCH FOR CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Monday U. Epko ed., 1979).
119. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2012).
120. See U.S. v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888,
894 (9th Cir. 1994).
121. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (J., Stewart, concurring).
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the world, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.122 Though
the Convention uses the term in its title, and enumerates various specific
forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence, etc.),
nowhere within the document is a definition for the term. Thus, this
approach essentially punts on the definitional problem, avoiding it
altogether.
Of the substantive legal definitions now in circulation, the most
common is what I will call the “World Bank definition”: “the abuse of
public office for private gain,” or minor variations thereon. The World
Bank has formally adopted or, to use its term, “settled” on this
definition.123 Minor variants of the definition, such as the illegal use of
public resources for personal gain,124 appear in other World Bank
publications.125 Transparency International, the world’s leading anticorruption NGO,126 has similarly adopted “the abuse of entrusted power
for private gain.”127 The United States Agency for International
Development has in turn adopted a variation: “the abuse of entrusted
authority for private gain.”128 This slightly broader definition encompasses
private-sector corruption, such as bank fraud, in addition to the more
familiar public-sector corruption.129
Tracing the World Bank definition’s intellectual heritage reveals its
inherent limitations. In the wake of Watergate, political scientists sought
to broaden the definition of corruption to encompass various forms of

122. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/58/4 (Oct. 31,
2003), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004) [hereinafter UNCAC].
123. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK 8 (1997), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/
corrptn.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK REPORT].
124. Id. at 19.
125. The Bank considered and rejected other, more narrow definitions, such as Susan RoseAckerman’s “an illegal payment to a public agent to obtain a benefit that may or may not be deserved
in the absence of payoffs” or Shleifer and Vishny’s “the sale by government officials of government
property for personal gain.” See id. at 19–20 n.1 (citing ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 116; Andre Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON.
599 (1993)).
126. Transparency International is an international NGO that “work[s] with partners in
government, business and civil society to put effective measures in place to tackle corruption.” See
Who We Are: Our Organisation, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/
organization (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
127. INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY & TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE CONNECTION 16 (2009), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/
40/131_web.pdf [hereinafter MAKING THE CONNECTION].
128. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AN ANTICORRUPTION READER: SUPPLEMENTAL SOURCES ON
TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, PREVENTION, ENFORCEMENT & EDUCATION 14 (2005), available
at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF530.pdf [hereinafter USAID REPORT].
129. Id.
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illicit behavior that the Watergate investigation exposed.130 The effort to
develop a more inclusive definition gave rise to remarkably broad
definitions. One group of scholars produced: “the misuse of authority as a
result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary.”131
Another scholar of this era defined corruption as “all illegal or unethical
use of governmental authority as a result of considerations of personal or
political gain.”132 Notably, these definitions are roughly contemporaneous
with another fruit of the Watergate investigations, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act itself.133
But scholars immediately criticized the newly-broadened definition for
“sacrific[ing] clarity to brevity.”134 Political scientists argued that
the looseness of contemporary definitions provides infinite scope
for argument. . . . [T]he danger here seems to be that clarity and
consistency in analysis may have been sacrificed for
comprehensiveness.
....
The fundamental weakness of the recent literature on corruption lies
in the use of vague criteria and inappropriate perspectives which
distort, exaggerate or otherwise over-simplify explanations of
corruption . . . .135
Though the broader World Bank definition’s appeal is that it
encompasses more than bribery (extortion, embezzlement, trading in
influence, etc.), it includes far too much to be of use. Specifically, it
encompasses conduct that, while controversial and perhaps distasteful, is
not generally thought to be the kind of corruption that the law can or
should proscribe. Consider the elected official who changes her position to
win the support of a targeted voting demographic, or votes against her
conscience to placate a donor. These may well constitute the abuse of

130. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Terms, Concepts, and Definitions, in PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION:
CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS 112 (Michael Johnston ed., 2010).
131. Id. at 114 (quoting this idea without citation).
132. Id. at 113 (quoting GEORGE C.S. BENSON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AMERICA xiii (1978)).
See also Carl J. Friedrich, Political Pathology, 37 POL. Q. 70, 74 (1966) (“deviant behavior associated
with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense.”).
133. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/guide.pdf.
134. Heidenheimer, supra note 130, at 111 (quoting ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER & MICHAEL
JOHNSTON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 3 (1989)).
135. Robert J. Williams, Political Corruption in the United States, 29 POL. STUD. 126–29 (1981).
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public office for public gain, and may elicit criticism. But, for better or for
worse, they are extraordinarily common even in societies not generally
thought to be relatively corrupt, and are not objects of the anti-corruption
movement. We live with them, resigned as we may be to human and
institutional imperfection, and are not especially eager to criminalize them.
So while the World Bank definition may serve the broader anti-corruption
effort, it is not particularly useful for legal purposes.
A more precise, but still inadequate, legal definition comes from
Black’s Law Dictionary. When not focusing specifically on the personal
moral corrupt intent of criminal law, Black’s defines corruption as “a
fiduciary’s or official’s use of a station or office to procure some benefit
either personally or for someone else, contrary to the rights of others.”136
This definition has gained some traction in federal case law on the
domestic bribery statute,137 and is sometimes mentioned tangentially in
relation to corrupt motive criminal litigation.138 But the definition does not
appear to have been formulated by courts. Black’s cites a series of latenineteenth century cases, but none actually uses the definition.139 Other
legal dictionaries from the early twentieth century cited variations
thereof.140 More recent cases will cite the definition, but none claims credit
for developing it; each will cite to it as Black’s.141 To adopt Judge
Friendly’s characterization of the ATS, the Black’s definition is a bit of a
“legal Lohengrin”—no one knows whence it came.142 The definition may
well be the product not of courts or legislatures, but of dictionary editors.
136. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
137. See United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Revis, 22 F.
Supp. 2d 1242, 1250 (N.D. Okla. 1998).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Aguilar,
515 U.S. 593, 597 (1995).
139. Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 347–48, 351 (1877) (“When an act is of such a nature that
a payment to the person by whom it is to be done would be at variance with good morals and the best
interests of society, a promise to pay another for inducing him to do it by secret and undue solicitation,
as distinguished form fair and open advocacy, will be deemed contrary to public policy, as giving
occasion for fraud and corruption. . . . Corruption is a hard word, not always accurately understood;
covering a multitude of official delinquencies, great and little. But it is strictly accurate to apply it to
any color of influence, of mere relation of any kind, on the administration of justice.”). See also
Worsham v. Murchison, 66 Ga. 715 (1881); United States v. Edwards, 43 F. 67 (S.D. Ala. 1890); State
v. Ragsdale, 59 Mo. App. 590 (1984).
140. See WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE FOSTER LONGSDORF, THE CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY
OF LAW WITH AN EXHAUSTIVE COLLECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 210 (1901); BALLANTINE’S LAW
DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969). See also “Corruption”: Legal Definition, DUHAIME.ORG,
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/Corruption.aspx (last visited Aug. 21, 2013).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978).
142. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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However well it may have encompassed the principal forms of legally
proscribed corruption in days of old, the advent of the modern anti-bribery
regime renders this definition antiquated. To understand the limitations of
this definition, consider a scenario in which a sole proprietorship
successfully bribes a foreign official for business purposes. By Black’s
definition, the public official has indeed engaged in corruption; she has
used her office to procure some benefit for herself that is contrary to the
rights of others. But has the bribe payor, the sole proprietor, engaged in
corruption? Black’s provides two categories of perpetrators: officials and
fiduciaries. The sole proprietor is neither: he is not the official, and
because he is not in an agent-principal relationship, he is not a fiduciary.
Accordingly, by Black’s definition, our sole proprietor has not engaged in
corruption; he has merely induced, or aided and abetted, corruption.
This definition is thus inconsistent with our modern sense of the word.
Nearly all would agree that the FCPA, for example, prohibits a specific
form of corruption—namely, bribery. And the FCPA criminalizes the
offering, but not the receipt, of a bribe.143 Few would accept that bribery
merely targets inducements or aids to corruption; we would agree that the
bribe is itself an act of corruption.
Indeed, two recently enacted legal documents reflect this contemporary
sense of the word, and in so doing tacitly refute Black’s. Perhaps most
telling is the definition of corruption implicit in the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery.144 Unlike UNCAC, the OECD Convention concerns
bribery specifically, and not the more general phenomenon of corruption
and its various manifestations. However, the Convention’s first endnote,
or “commentary,” explains that the Convention deals with “active
bribery,” which is the payment or offering of a bribe by a private actor to a
foreign official (also known as supply-side bribery).145 But the note goes
on to explain that active bribery is also often referred to in various
countries as “active corruption.”146 Note that corruption, by this
contemporary definition, extends to the offering or payment of a bribe by a
private actor.
Similarly, the U.K. recently enacted a Bribery Law that aimed to bring
its antiquated corruption laws into conformity with the modern standards

143. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)), -2(a), -3(a) (2012).
144. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
145. Id. at 14, para. 1.
146. Id.
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reflected in the OECD Convention or the FCPA.147 The parliamentary
reports explain that since enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act in
1906, U.K. law defined corruption to require an agent/principal
relationship; absent this relationship, an act may well be improper but was
not, strictly speaking, a legally recognized form of corruption.148 After
years of consideration, Parliament elected to drop this requirement, stating
that it wished to “avoid the need for an agent to betray a principal as in
[past] legislation. The offence [of bribery] would be committed by
someone who offers an advantage to another as a reward for breaching a
trust, or breaching a duty to act impartially . . . .”149 Both the OECD and
the U.K., then, have abandoned the notion that a private actor engages in
corruption only insofar as she breaches a fiduciary duty.
The anticipated defense of Black’s proves unpersuasive on several
counts. The defense would be that for most commercial entities, the bribe
payor will be an agent acting on behalf of its principal, the entity. Because
committing an illegal act constitutes a violation of fiduciary duty, the bribe
payor has now fallen within Black’s definition. But this explanation
suffers from three distinct problems. First, by this logic the bribe payment
constitutes corruption only because the law prohibits the bribe; prior to
enactment of the FCPA, the act was not illegal and the fiduciary therefore
did not violate a duty. But we do not deem bribery corrupt because it is
illegal; we have made it illegal because it is corrupt. As the legislative
history shows, congressional debates focused on the question of whether
to prohibit this form of corruption, not whether we should consider the
conduct corrupt. Black’s definition, which precedes these debates by
decades, does not capture our more modern sense.
The second reason Black’s definition fails is that it does not capture our
sense of who the victims of bribery truly are. The victim of a breach of
fiduciary duty is the principal—the company, its shareholders. Although
shareholders are among the victims of FCPA violations, as evidenced by
contemporary shareholder suits, once again this is true only because we
have made bribery illegal. But bribery had its victims long before the
FCPA was enacted, and we enacted it in very large part to protect those
victims. Commentators have generally acknowledged that overseas

147. Bribery Act, 2010, ch. 23 (U.K.).
148. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 34, § 1 (U.K.). See also Joint Committee
on the Draft Corruption Bill, Report 2002-3, H.L., H.C., HL Paper 157, HC 705, para. 3 (U.K.),
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/jtcorr/157/15702.htm.
149. See House of Commons Library, Bribery Bill [HL], Bill No 69 § 2.3 (H.C. Research Paper
10/19, 2010) (U.K), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2010/
rp10-019.pdf.
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corporate bribery has two kinds of victims: the citizens of corrupt regimes,
whose regulations are circumvented and whose safety and prosperity are
thereby jeopardized,150 and the companies who comply with anti-bribery
norms only to lose business to noncompliant companies.151 Defining the
victims of bribery in this way, Black’s definition fails to capture that the
payor has done anything harmful.
To divine the third reason for the failure of Black’s, consider who has
engaged in the wrongful conduct under its definition, and consequently
who is liable. Officials and fiduciaries evidently bear liability for
violations under the definition—they are the only ones who have violated
a duty. But in the vast majority of settled FCPA cases, the defendant is
neither an official nor a fiduciary; it is a corporation. Because Black’s
definition tacitly limits private-actor liability to fiduciaries, a corporation,
much like a sole proprietor, cannot be liable. This plainly contradicts our
contemporary sense of corruption.
Accordingly, I want to propose a new definition of corruption, one that
corrects each of the deficiencies in Black’s. That definition is:
“Conduct by a public or private actor that is intended to procure
some benefit, either personally or for someone else, the granting of
which would contravene official or fiduciary duty and the rights of
others.”
By this definition, any private individual, whether natural or juridical, may
engage in corruption. Such private conduct is not narrowly tied to
fiduciary duty: although the granting of the benefit may be wrong by
virtue of a fiduciary breach, the bribe payor need not violate a fiduciary
duty, or even be a fiduciary, to engage in corruption. The granting of the
benefit must violate either an official or fiduciary duty: officials are
prohibited from accepting bribes in virtually every jurisdiction in the
world; and the definition includes fiduciaries to encompass private-sector
forms of corruption. Accordingly, by this definition, a company that bribes

150. Philip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2006); Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 689, 691–94 (2000).
151. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interest: International Legalization in
the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141, S167 (2002); David A. Gantz, Globalizing
Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus, 18 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 457, 461 (1998); Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Note, Combating Foreign Bribery:
Legislative Reform in the United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement, 49
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 365, 367–68 (2011). See also Corruption Data, TRANSPARENCY INT’L
U.K., http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption-data (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
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an overseas official for business purposes has engaged in an act of
corruption.
This definition not only captures our modern sense of the word, but as
the next Part shows, it also captures our philosophical legacy.
B. Rediscovering Corruption as a Violation of Natural Rights
Rooting a theory of international human rights in a particular
philosophical tradition proves culturally sensitive, but necessary. As the
United Nations went to work drafting the 1948 Universal of Declaration of
Human Rights—the first document purporting to make a statement of
universal human rights with the support of nearly all nations of the
world—it solicited contributions from thinkers of various cultural and
philosophical traditions: American, European, Chinese, Indian, Middle
Eastern, and others.152 The committee was astonished to find that despite
the radically divergent philosophical underpinnings, the core principles
were present in many cultural and religious traditions.153 The subgroup
charged with drafting the document, the U.N. Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), would come to believe that peoples
could agree on what rights were, even if they could not agree on the proper
philosophical justification for them. As one UNESCO drafter reportedly
quipped, “we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us
why.”154
Louis Henkin would similarly write that in the modern era, “[t]he
justification of human rights is rhetorical, not philosophical” and that the
idea of human rights “does not ground or justify itself . . . in any . . .
political theory.”155 But be that as it may, this Article is disinclined toward
rhetorical exercises; it seeks a deeper philosophical foundation for the
rights claim, even if it requires making the somewhat unfashionable choice
of a particular philosophical tradition.
With some embarrassment, we should probably concede that cultural
preferences are at present built into anti-bribery enforcement itself.
Though corruption prohibitions are increasingly garnering universal
support, it is a regrettable truth that the vast majority of enforcement
activity now occurs in what might loosely be deemed the Anglo-Saxon

152. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 73 (2001).
153. Id. at 76.
154. Id. at 77.
155. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2 (1990).
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world. The U.S. has taken the lead in enforcement, which is why most of
this Article concerns the U.S. statute. The second most newsworthy
enforcement jurisdiction today is probably the U.K., which passed a new
statute in 2010 with which MNCs around the world are now struggling to
comply. A distant third (and indeed, a distant relative of the modern
Anglo-Saxon world) might be Germany, which has worked with the U.S.
to bring significant fines against corporate bribe-payors.156
Accordingly, I base this Article’s rights argument in the Anglo-Saxon
philosophical tradition, particularly the foundational rights philosophy of
John Locke. As a British philosopher whose ideas provided the foundation
for the later U.S. revolution against Britain, Locke’s thinking has exerted
the dominant intellectual influence on thinking about rights. And natural
law theory, tracing its origins to Locke, is again the topic of a vibrant
intellectual debate within the legal academy, engaged in by such
luminaries as Randy Barnett, Richard Epstein, and Jeremy Waldron.157
Though Locke did not use the term, the concept as herein defined—
conduct by a public or private actor that is intended to procure some
benefit, either personally or for someone else, the granting of which would
contravene official or fiduciary duty and the rights of others—pervaded his
rights theory. Locke holds that we can discern the function of government
by first reflecting on what the human condition is or would be in its
absence. Locke posits a natural condition of “freedom to order their
actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit,
within the bounds of the law of Nature.”158 In this condition of natural
freedom, we also live in a state of “equality, wherein all the power and
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.”159 Each being
free and equal, with none possessing a greater jurisdiction than another,
the enforcement of the law is “put into every man’s hands, whereby every
one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as
may hinder its violation.”160 Although humans thus have a natural right to

156. Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption [Anti-Corruption Act], August 19, 1997, BGBl. I at
2038.
157. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Imperative of Natural Rights in Today’s World (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 03-20,
2003); Richard Epstein, The Natural Law Bridge Between Private Law and Public International Law,
13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47 (2012); Jeremy Waldron, What is Natural Law Like? (NYU Sch. of Law,
Research Paper No. 12-27, 2012); Jeremy Waldron, The Decline of the Natural Right (NYU Sch. of
Law, Research Paper No. 09-38, 2009).
158. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 8 (Prometheus Books ed.
1986).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 10.
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liberty and equality, we would not yet speak of a right to be free of
corruption. Corruption as defined above could not occur; because there is
no government in the state of nature, there are no official duties and thus
no granting of benefits in contravention of those duties.
But natural liberty and natural equality turn out to be rather
incompatible, as the latter ruins the former. Experience teaches that “it is
unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will
make men partial to themselves and their friends; and, on the other side,
ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others,
and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow.”161 In seeking to
protect our own rights under color of enforcing the law of nature, we tend
to encroach upon the rights of others. What is lacking in the state of nature
is a “common measure to decide all controversies,” “a known and
indifferent” source of power.162 The precariousness of our natural freedom
induces us to establish a government, the defining purpose of which is to
“be the remedy of those evils which necessarily follow from men being
judges in their own cases.”163
At this moment, having established a government that preserves the
freedom that in nature is violated, civil society begins.
Those who are united into one body, and have a common
established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide
controversies between them . . . are in civil society one with
another; but those who have no such common appeal . . . are still in
the state of Nature.164
The difference between civil society and the state of nature is the existence
of a government that is “bound to govern by established standing laws,
promulgated and known by the people, and not by extemporary
decrees.”165 And this government, thus constituted, must be “directed to no
other end than the peace, safety, and public good of the people.”166 Indeed,
the very definition of legitimate political power is the “right of making
laws, with penalties of death and all less penalties . . . only for the public
good.”167

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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Civil society, instituted by creating a government, thus makes possible
a freedom that could not exist in the state of nature. This conclusion is
ironic, given Locke’s strong claim of natural freedom. But the irony is not
lost on Locke, and he responds:
If man in the state of Nature be so free . . . why will he part with his
freedom . . . and subject himself to the dominion and control of any
other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the
state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very
uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others . . . the
enjoyment of his property is very unsafe, very insecure . . . full of
fears and continual dangers.168
Locke fully recognizes that though freedom exists in nature, full freedom
is only realized in civil society: “the end of law is not to abolish or
restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom.”169 Put another way, “[f]or
in all the states of created beings, capable of laws, where there is no law
there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence
from others, which cannot be where there is no law.”170 Liberty, to which
we are entitled by nature, can therefore only exist under a properly
constituted government.
To the extent that the government rules by standing laws, known by
and promulgated to the people and directed to the public good, our natural
right to liberty is protected and enjoyed. To the extent that the government
rules otherwise, the right is violated or, to use Locke’s term, “invaded.”
Thus he writes, “[t]he liberty of man in society is to be under no other
legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth,
nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that
legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it.”171 And freedom, by
definition, is “to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of
that society, and made by the legislative power . . . not to be subject to the
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man.”172
At this point the relationship between natural rights and corruption
becomes clear. Locke’s freedom, though natural, can only exist where
government confers benefits in accordance with the official duty to govern
by standing rules directed to the common good. The natural right to liberty

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 69.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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is thus violated when officials confer benefits in contravention of standing
law, official duty, and the public good. Note the striking similarity
between this basic and uncontroversial Lockean reading, and this Article’s
definition of corruption: “Conduct by a public or private actor that is
intended to procure some benefit, either personally or for someone else,
the granting of which would contravene official or fiduciary duty and the
rights of others.” Official conduct that procures a benefit in violation of
official duty, and contrary to the rights of others, is but another way of
describing the failure to govern by standing laws directed to the public
good. Where the government has ceased to rule by standing laws without
preference, where benefits are granted contrary to official duty and the
rights of others, citizens “have no such decisive power to appeal to, [and]
they are still in the state of Nature.”173 Corruption thus voids the social
contract, destroys government, and returns society to a state of nature.
Indeed, when Locke defines tyranny as “making use of the power any one
has in his hands not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own
private, separate advantage,”174 he is describing corruption by a different
name.
C. Rejecting the Modern View of Corruption as Merely a Means of
Violating Rights
The Lockean philosophy of natural rights temporarily fell out of
fashion with the end of the Enlightenment, displaced by the utilitarianism
of Jeremy Bentham175 and John Stuart Mill.176 Nations, particularly the
United States, came to embrace utilitarianism as philosophical justification
for the rise of the welfare state,177 and by the early twentieth century rights
talk had substantially receded. However, this would change in dramatic
fashion with World War II and the Holocaust, which reignited interest in
the proposition that irrespective of aggregate happiness, there are some
things that governments simply may not do.
Though the more pluralistic intellectual climate would favor the less
sectarian philosophy of Immanuel Kant,178 Lockean themes are still

173. Id. at 50.
174. Id. at 108. See also id. at 109 (“Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed
to another’s harm.”).
175. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789).
176. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863).
177. HENKIN, supra note 155, at 5.
178. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785).
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evident in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 3
provides that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.”179 Article 10 provides that “Everyone is entitled in full equality to
a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations . . . .”180 Government is, of
course, to be neutral; the Declaration affirms the right not to be subject to
what Locke called “the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of
another man.”181 Article 29 provides that
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.182
This is but a restatement of the Lockean right to be subject to no restraint
save that which a duly constituted government has established for the
public good. And of course, these claims to rights are universal, as Article
28 provides that “[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized.”183
The Declaration thus contemplates an international order in which
relations between nations further protect these rights. Though the
Declaration does not use the word “corruption,” the concept is there by
another name. In reacting against tyranny it defines legitimate
government, and in so doing articulates those themes that the above
analysis shows are fundamentally about corruption.
Despite this modern invocation of anti-corruption themes,
contemporary anti-corruption writings have not yet embraced the principle
that corruption is an inherent rights violation, asserting instead that
corruption is merely the means of violating rights. The leading anticorruption NGO, Transparency International, teamed with the
International Council on Human Rights Policy to author what is perhaps
the defining modern work on the relationship between corruption and
rights. In Corruption and Human Rights: Making the Connection,184 they

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

UDHR, supra note 113, art. 3.
Id. art. 10.
See supra text accompanying note 172.
UDHR, supra note 113, art. 29.
Id. art. 28.
MAKING THE CONNECTION, supra note 127.
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argue that “the cycle of corruption facilitates, perpetuates and
institutionalises [sic] human rights violations.”185 Acknowledging the
possibility of framing corruption as an inherent violation, the document
instead “takes a different approach” by applying “human rights principles
and methods usefully in anti-corruption programmes.”186 They
acknowledge that “where corruption is widespread, states cannot comply
with their human rights obligations,”187 but ultimately find that the most
direct connection between corruption and human rights exists where “a
corrupt act is deliberately used as a means to violate a right.”188
The means-ends framework now dominates the academic
scholarship,189 and can be traced to what may be the foundational
academic work on the relationship between corruption and human rights,
Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale’s, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as
an Individual and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption
to a Crime Under International Law.190 Kofele-Kale comes close to seeing
corruption as an inherent violation, but ultimately stops just shy of that
mark. He begins by asserting that the “right to a corruption-free society” is
a “fundamental human right; a right that should be recognized as a

185. Id. at vi.
186. Id. at 3.
187. Id. at 23.
188. Id. at 27. See also Andreanna M. Truelove, Note, Oil, Diamonds, and Sunlight: Fostering
Human Rights Through Transparency in Revenues from Natural Resources, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 207
(2003) (“Government corruption provides both an incentive and a means for human rights
violations.”).
189. See MARTINE BOERSMA, CORRUPTION: A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND A CRIME
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW? 202–64 (2012) (enumerating the various specific and alreadyrecognized rights that corruption violates); C. RAJ KUMAR, CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INDIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSPARENCY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 42 (2011) (“The
first step in developing a theoretical framework for recognizing corruption as a human rights issue is to
examine the different types of human rights that are affected through corruption.”); John Hatchard,
Adopting a Human Rights Approach Towards Combating Corruption, in CORRUPTION & HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Martine Boersma & Hans Nelen eds., 2010); Magdalena
Supelveda Carmona & Julio Bacio-Terracino, Corruption and Human Rights: Making the Connection,
in CORRUPTION & HUMAN RIGHTS, supra; James Thuo Gathi, Defining the Relationship Between
Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 125 (2009); Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change or the
Illusion of Change: the War Against Official Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 697
(2006); Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International Law in
Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 691 (2007); Kenny Feng, The Human Rights
Implications of Corruption: An Alien Tort Claims Act-Based Analysis 1 (Wharton Undergraduate
Research Scholars, Research Paper No. WH-299-301, 2004). For scholars who are more skeptical of
the effort to frame corruption as a human rights problem, see, e.g., Morag Goodwin & Kate RoseSender, Linking Corruption and Human Rights: An Unwelcome Addition to the Development
Discourse, in CORRUPTION & HUMAN RIGHTS, supra.
190. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective
Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under International Law, 34 INT’L LAW. 149
(2000) [hereinafter Kofele-Kale, Elevating].
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component part of the right to economic self-determination and the right to
development.”191 He first invokes the Kantian language that human rights
are “derived from the belief that all human beings are born equal in dignity
and rights, and that these moral claims are inalienable and inherent in all
human individuals by virtue of their humanity.”192 He also marries the
asserted right to earlier social contract theory, arguing that “the owners of
these evidently basic rights of humankind—life, liberty and property—
have never surrendered them to the state. Rather, all that the individual
surrenders to the state upon entering civil society is the right to have these
rights enforced by the state.”193
Kofele-Kale never fully articulates the precise reason why corruption
violates a right, thus remaining stuck in corruption-as-means analysis. He
makes significant progress when asserting that “life, dignity, and other
important human values depend on” a government free from corruption.194
Kofele-Kale further argues that the right “flows from” the “right to
economic self-determination.”195 While this is true, it does not quite
establish corruption as an inherent rights violation. Kofele-Kale has
identified a close connection between corruption and other rights, but that
which “flows from” a right is not necessarily a right. In this same vein, he
finds that corruption “also implicates the collective right to development,”
that economic development “will better enable a country to guarantee the
economic and social rights of its inhabitants,” and that “societal
development is essential for individual development which is necessary to
enable individuals to know their rights, to claim them, to realize and to
enjoy them and the human dignity they promise.”196 Again, though the
relationship between corruption and development is persuasive and
compelling, it does little to establish corruption as an inherent rights
violation.
Kofele-Kale ultimately argues that freedom from corruption “can be
viewed as a freestanding, autonomous right,”197 and his analysis gets us
partway there.198 So too are other scholars locked into a means-end

191. Id. at 152.
192. Id. at 163.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 163–64.
196. Id. at 165. See also Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
197. Kofele-Kale, Elevating, supra note 190, at 152.
198. See also Nihal Jayawickrama, The Impact of Corruption on Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (2006),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/HR.POL.GG.
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conception of the relationship between corruption and human rights.199
The present Article aspires to move the academic literature forward by
drawing on Lockean thought to demonstrate that freedom from corruption
can, and should, be understood as a foundational human right, indeed the
defining right of civil society.
III. A NEW CORNERSTONE: REBUILDING CORPORATE LIABILITY AFTER
KIOBEL
The ATS was always a strange candidate to serve as the cornerstone of
a federal statutory regime for deterring overseas corporate rights
violations. But we would not let the perfect be the enemy of the good,
seizing upon that ambiguous statute because it seemed the best available
for pursuing this compelling goal.
That perception is wrong-headed. This Part argues that the ATS never
has been and, after Kiobel, never will be the principal federal statute by
which corporations are held liable for overseas human rights violations.
The FCPA represents a better statutory model for deterring overseas,
rights-related corporate misconduct. Post-Kiobel, scholars should come to
recognize the FCPA as the principal federal statute for deterring such
conduct, and should direct their energies to better understanding how the
FCPA can more effectively achieve this goal.
Part III.A will compare the two statutes to illustrate how the FCPA is a
more legally sound and practically effective cornerstone on which to build
a federal statutory regime of corporate liability for human rights abuses.
But if the FCPA is to fully achieve its goal, two sets of reforms are
needed: first, we must develop a scheme for remedying the harms that
known incidences of large-scale corporate bribery caused; and second, we
must work more effectively to create uniform enforcement among the
capital-exporting nations. But neither of these reforms is unprecedented in
federal law: to discern the first we can look to environmental law, and for
the second to intellectual property.

SEM.2006.BP.1.pdf (“[T]he campaign to contain corruption and the movement for the promotion and
protection of human rights are not disparate processes. They are inextricably linked and
interdependent.”); Truelove, supra note 188, at 207.
199. See generally Gaathi, supra note 189; Kofele-Kale, supra note 189; Snider & Kidane, supra
note 189; Feng, supra note 189.
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A. The FCPA as the ATS Might Have Been
The ATS has been the crux of what Harold Koh famously called
“transnational legal process,” in which domestic courts are used to develop
standards of international law.200 Koh argued that bringing suits under
international law in U.S. courts result in the development, and perhaps the
incorporation, of international human rights norms into U.S. law.201 His
followers urged usage of this strategy to create a “dialogic process of
transnational judicial dialogue itself—of interaction, interpretation, and
internalization among the world’s judges—that ensures the generation and
proliferation of norms that are ‘legitimate’ on the international plane.”202
The ATS has been widely thought to provide a means of achieving this
goal and indeed, among U.S. statutes is perhaps uniquely situated to do so.
But the ATS’s strength may have proven to be its liability. The process
of incorporating international human rights standards into U.S. law
through the ATS has yielded a number of legal issues that go to the very
essence of the statute’s purpose. Scholars, litigants, and judges have
vigorously disputed such fundamental questions as why Congress enacted
the statute in the first place; the origin of its cause of action; whether
jurisdiction is universal; whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality, recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Morrison,203
should apply to the ATS, and if so, to what extent; whether liability
extends to corporations or is limited to natural persons; what the ATS’s
impact on foreign relations could be; and whether that impact should be
relevant to the courts’ construction of its application.204 The ATS has thus

200. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)); Harold Hongju Koh, Lecture, How is
International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1413–14 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh,
Address, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 646–
55, 663–66 (1998).
201. Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, supra note 200, at 1415–16.
202. Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the “New” Schools: Assessing the Legitimacy of
International Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 455, 463 (2007).
203. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
204. See generally Supplemental Brief of Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738
(2012) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2165340; Special Feature: Kiobel Symposium, SCOTUSBLOG (July
6–26, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/kiobel-symposium/. For the foreign
policy debate specifically, see, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International
Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492 (2004); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687 (2004).
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proven to be a rather shaky foundation on which to build a regime of
corporate liability for overseas human rights violations.
The FCPA, by contrast, is vulnerable to none of these disputes. It
eschews the attempted incorporation of international law into federal
common law by the federal judiciary in favor of a clear congressional
directive based on undisputed constitutional authority and well-established
common-law liability.
The first U.S. Congress enacted the ATS as part of the 1789 Judiciary
Act, the full text providing merely that “district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”205 From its
enactment until 1980, the law was invoked only twenty-one times,206 and
only two courts had ever upheld jurisdiction under the statute.207 With the
watershed case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala208 in 1980, the statute found new
life and perhaps even assumed a new identity: an instrument for allowing
aliens to hold persons liable for overseas human rights abuses in U.S.
courts.
From 1997 until 2010, the courts regularly used the ATS to hold
corporate defendants liable for rights violations.209 Though the Supreme
Court had subtly raised the question of whether corporations could be
liable in a footnote to its only decision on the ATS,210 no lower court
accepted the court’s invitation to overturn corporate liability until 2011.
Then, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,211 the Second Circuit heard the
appeal of a Nigerian national who has sued three international companies
for allegedly arranging with the Nigerian government to militarily
suppress resistance to the companies’ oil drilling. The Second Circuit held
that corporations are not liable under the ATS because the principle of
corporate liability has not been established specifically in international
law.212
The Supreme Court granted Kiobel’s writ of certiorari and held an
initial hearing in February 2011 on the question of whether corporations

205. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
206. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into the
Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4–5 n.15 (1985).
207. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C.
1795) (No. 1067).
208. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
209. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
210. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
211. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
212. Id. at 145.
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could be liable for human rights violations under customary international
law. During the hearing, some justices expressed concern about whether
the statute authorized U.S. courts to hear cases alleging violations of
international law that occurred on foreign soil, and the Court took the
extraordinary step of ordering a second round of briefing and argument to
explore that precise topic.213 Though Congress plainly has the
constitutional authority to enact statutes with application beyond the U.S.
borders,214 courts have developed a presumption against extraterritorial
application that may only be rebutted by “the affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed” in the language of the relevant act.215 The
Supreme Court affirmed this presumption in 2010, finding that Section 10b of the 1934 Exchange Act lacked such a statement of congressional
intent and therefore did not provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs
suing a foreign company for fraud in relation to securities purchased on a
foreign exchange.216
The Supreme Court in Sosa ominously warned of courts using the ATS
to “claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their own
citizens.”217 That warning proved prescient. The Court’s April 2013 Kiobel
opinion never even reached corporate liability under international law,
instead ruling entirely on extraterritorial application. Finding that “the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS,
and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption,” the Nigerian
petitioners’ claim was barred.218 In dicta, the Court further stated that for
an ATS claim to be valid, the conduct in question must “touch and
concern” the territory of the U.S. with “sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality.”219 But although the Court
provided almost no guidance on how that test should apply in practice, the
vast majority of the cases historically brought under the ATS would
almost certainly fail this test. Kiobel thus does not quite eliminate liability
for overseas rights violations, but comes terribly close.
By contrast, there may be no better example of a clear expression of
affirmative intention to apply extraterritorially than the FCPA. The statute

213. Oral Argument at 10:02, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (No. 10-1491),
available at http://harvardhumanrights.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/10-1491rearg.pdf.
214. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Congress has the authority to
enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”).
215. Id.
216. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875, 2883 (2010).
217. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
218. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
219. Id. at 1669.
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prohibits making payments to “foreign officials,”220 and this is understood
by all to routinely occur on foreign soil. Moreover, unlike the ATS, the
FCPA’s legislative history makes abundantly clear that the statute is
designed specifically to address bribes that actually did occur there.
Indeed, the FCPA represents the quintessential congressional grant of
extraterritorial application that the Supreme Court did not find in the
Exchange Act or the ATS.
One can imagine, however, an ATS case involving a corporate
defendant that did indeed satisfy the touch and concern test. That case
would likely then become the occasion to revisit the original question
before the Court of corporate liability. And this issue remains highly
unsettled. In the wake of the Second Circuit’s ruling, scholars and
advocates have raised a staggering number of sub-issues on which little
agreement seems to exist. Did the framers who ratified the 1789 Judiciary
Act intend to exempt any class of defendant?221 Does the proper source
today for determining whether corporations are liable lie in international or
federal common law?222 If the former, is corporate liability now
recognized in international human rights law?223 Is corporate liability even
desirable as a matter of policy,224 and would it promote or deter investment
in developing countries?225 Here, the weaknesses of transnational legal
process are perhaps clearest; looking to international law to establish
corporate liability has proven a minefield.
The FCPA does not invite such disputation. There is no doubt that both
juridical and natural persons may be both civilly and criminally liable for

220. FCPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), - 2(a), - 3(a) (2012).
221. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History William R. Casto, Martin S. Flaherty,
Robert W. Gordon, Nasser Hussain, and John v. Orth in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2165340.
222. See Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL
2161290.
223. See Brief of Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491),
2012 WL 2165340.
224. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort
Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161 (2012).
225. See Brief of Joseph E. Stiglitz as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Mohamad v.
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2011) (Nos. 11-88, 10-1491), 2011 WL 6813580 (arguing that
ATS enforcement promotes long-term investment and economic growth); Brief of the Clearing House
Ass’n L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 738 (No. 10-1491)
(arguing that aiding-and-abetting claims discourage corporations from doing business in developing
countries); Brief For the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 738 (No. 10-1491) (also arguing deterrence).
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violations. The statute makes this explicit,226 and is supported by a century
of case law that has extended criminal liability to corporations.227 While
questions remain concerning whether criminal law specifically may deter
investment in developing countries, these disputes are academic and
would gain no traction in a court of law. And even among academics,
there is no question that corporations must be at least civilly liable if the
statute is to have any meaning whatsoever. But more to the point, none can
deny that the statute makes both civil and criminal liability explicit and
that they both rest on the sound legal footing of congressional enactment,
constitutional authority, and well-established case law.
But even if none of these legal vulnerabilities existed, one would still
wonder how effective the ATS had ever become in deterring overseas
corporate misconduct. Admittedly, the ATS has played an important role
in the recent global development of enforceable human rights norms.228
But prior to and independently of Kiobel, federal courts had begun to
constrain the ability of plaintiffs to sue corporate defendants, principally
through pleading standards, forum non conveniens, and exhaustion of
remedies requirements.229 Though ATS filings continue in federal court,
the vast majority have resulted in favorable rulings for the defendant and
only a relative handful seem to have settled.230 Indeed, one scholar
recently characterized the chances for plaintiffs to receive meaningful
restitution under the ATS as “dim.”231
Perhaps for this reason, among corporate law firms one observes very
little attention paid to compliance with the ATS, creating a dramatic
contrast with what has facetiously been called “FCPA Inc.”232 Though
such firms might briefly mention recent decisions on their websites,233 one
will rarely see these firms sponsoring compliance training seminars for the
ATS. Exactly the opposite has proven true for the FCPA. Anti-bribery
compliance has become among the most rapidly-growing practice areas of

226. FCPA 28 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1)—(2) (2012).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
228. Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 971 (2004).
229. See Childress, supra note 4.
230. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends
and Out-of Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456 (2011); Michael
Goldhaber, The Life and Death of the Corporate Alien Tort, THE AM. LAWYER (Oct. 12, 2010),
available at http:/www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleINtl.jsp?id=1202473215797.
231. Childress, supra note 4, at 725.
232. Joe Palazollo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2012, at B1.
233. See, e.g., Alien Tort Statute, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, http://www.omm.com/alientort
statute/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2014).

Washington University Open Scholarship

1408

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:1365

the last decade, as compliance training opportunities abound and firms
develop specialty FCPA practice groups. The rise of this industry is due in
large part to the FCPA’s proven record to obtain, and collect, settlements
against multinational companies in the tens or hundreds of millions of
dollars and on occasion even surpassing $1 billion.234 While actual
compliance with a given statute is difficult to quantify, to the extent that
publicly-advertised corporate compliance training may be taken as a rough
gauge of corporate concern there can be no doubt that the FCPA has
induced corporate compliance in a way that the ATS never did.
In comparing these two statutes’ capacity to deter rights violations, the
very different rights that each statute touches will immediately rise into
relief. Under the ATS, plaintiffs have typically brought suit for the most
egregious of rights violations: kidnapping,235 torture,236 arbitrary
detention,237 murder,238 genocide,239 slavery,240 sexual assault,241 and
others.242 Causes of actions for these violations could obviously never be
brought under an anti-bribery statute; admittedly, this represents a
limitation in the use of the FCPA as a human rights tool.
But we should not discount those rights violations that an anti-bribery
statute does indeed touch, both directly and indirectly. As this Article has
already shown, bribery should be regarded in the first instance as an
inherent rights violation.243 And as the two case studies illustrated above,
bribery is also a tool by which a number of other rights violations occur:
the right to equal protection before the law, to political representation, to
self-determination, to food, housing, and medical care, to education, to
equal access to a country’s public services, to safe working conditions, and
to control natural resources.244 While perhaps not as dramatic as the ATS
rights, or as harmful to any given individual victim, the FCPA rights are
more pervasive and more systematic, impacting a far broader cross-section
of society, and the world, than the ATS rights ever have. While I would

234. See Richard L. Cassin, Who Will Crack the Top Ten?, THE FCPA BLOG (Aug. 3, 2012, 11:18
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/8/3/who-will-crack-the-top-ten.html.
235. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
236. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
237. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
238. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012); Habyarimana v. Kagame, 696 F.3d
1029 (10th Cir. 2012).
239. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
240. See Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308 (2d Cir. 2012).
241. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
242. See, e.g., Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute,
and Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 32–33 (2007).
243. See supra Part I.B.
244. See supra Part II.C.
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not suggest that the ATS rights are somehow less important or deserving
of redress, this Article does argue that effectively reducing violations of
those rights that the FCPA touches would constitute no less significant an
achievement.
The FCPA thus provides a welcome alternative to the transnational
legal process of the ATS. Rather than asking the courts to discern illdefined international standards and incorporate them in to federal common
law, Congress exercised its constitutional authority to engage both the
executive and judicial branches in the enforcement and interpretation of a
relatively straightforward statutory prohibition. The bribery prohibition
can more fully achieve its potential as a human rights tool with two
specific amendments, as the next Parts describe.
B. Compensating Victims by Following the Precedent of Environmental
Law
Though the FCPA can thus address the rights violations that a majority
of the world’s population faces daily, this Article has shown that the
FCPA has fallen far short of its potential to improve the legal and social
conditions victims.245 The first step in remedying this problem lies in using
enforcement mechanisms to compensate the communities victimized by
large-scale corporate corruption.
Outside the U.S., the idea of compensating victims of international
corporate bribery has gained some traction; in particular, the U.K. has
twice endorsed the idea publicly. When the British defense contractor
BAE entered into a £30 million settlement in connection with illicit
payments in Tanzania,246 the sentencing judge declared that the “real
victims” of these bribes were the people of Tanzania.247 Accordingly, the
SFO, the Department for International Development (DFID), the
Government of Tanzania, and BAE eventually agreed that most of the
settlement would be used to fund educational projects in Tanzania,
including the purchase of desks, textbooks and teacher instruction manuals
for elementary schools.248 Then-Director of the SFO, Richard Alderman,

245. See supra Part I.B.
246. See Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, BAE Systems Plc (Feb. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2010/bae-systems-plc.aspx.
247. See Adam Greaves, Tanzania Urged to Prosecute Over the BAE Systems Bribery Claim, THE
FRAUD BOARD (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.thefraudboard.com/public-officials/tanzania-urged-toprosecute-over-the-bae-systems-bribery-claim/.
248. See Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, BAE Systems Will Pay Towards Educating
Children in Tanzania After Signing an Agreement Brokered by the Serious Fraud Office (Mar. 15,
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described it as providing “a satisfactory outcome for all concerned but
most of all for the Tanzanian people.”249 Similarly, when the British
engineering firm of Mabey & Johnson paid £6.6 million in criminal fines
for bribes allegedly paid in Jamaica and Ghana, the UK returned a portion
of those funds to the people of those countries, declaring, “[t]he SFO is
committed to the interests of the victims of overseas corporate
corruption.”250
One would search in vain for any such quotations from U.S.
enforcement officials. The DOJ and SEC simply have not embraced the
notion that the fines and penalties from FCPA enforcement actions should
benefit bribery’s victims. But this is not because victims groups have not
tried. Specifically, two approaches have been attempted, both of which are
bound to fail. This Part will describe those attempts and then propose a
more promising alternative, drawing on the example of environmental law.
The first failed attempt involved certain victims seeking formal
recognition under U.S. victims’ rights laws. These statutes emerged from
the victims’ rights movement of the last couple of decades and are
designed to afford the victims of federal crimes restitution and other
rights. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), enacted as part
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,251 makes
restitution mandatory252 (unlike its predecessor, the Victims Witness and
Protection Act in which restitution was discretionary253). It defines
“victim” to mean a “person directly and proximately harmed” as a result of
a federal crime, and person is defined to include organizations.254
Similarly, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004 affords several
enumerated rights to victims, including the right to attend and to speak at
criminal proceedings, the right to protection from the accused, and the

2012), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/baesystems-will-pay-towards-educating-children-in-tanzania-after-signing-an-agreement-brokered-by-theserious-fraud-office.aspx.
249. Id.
250. See Richard L. Cassin, Breakthrough in Britain, THE FCPA BLOG (Sept. 29, 2009, 8:02 PM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/9/30/breakthrough-in-britain.html (discussing the Mabey &
Johnson settlement).
251. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 204(a), 110
Stat. 1227 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (1996)
(codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2267 (2000)).
252. MVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(1).
253. Victims Witness and Protection Act of 1996 (“VWPA”), Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248
(1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., with the restitution provision at 18
U.S.C. § 3663 (2000)).
254. Id. § 3663A(2).
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right to restitution.255 It too defines victims broadly to include both natural
and legal persons directly and proximately harmed by the commission of a
federal crime.256 Under these statutes, courts have accordingly ordered
restitution to corporations,257 universities,258 neighborhood associations,259
and government agencies.260
These statutes were recently brought to bear on FCPA enforcement in
the Alcatel-Lucent action, in which the French parent company and
several of its subsidiaries paid $17 million to several officials in Costa
Rica to obtain telecommunications contracts.261 The bribe recipients were
employees of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, S.A. (“ICE”), the
country’s government-run electricity and telecommunications provider. As
France and the U.S. were concluding its joint investigation, ICE sought to
compel the U.S. government to provide restitution on the grounds that ICE
was entitled to be deemed a victim under various of these statutes.262 ICE
argued in federal court that although certain of its employees had accepted
bribes, the entity in general was the victim—it had awarded hundreds of
millions of dollars in contracts fraudulently.263 The DOJ marshaled
substantial evidence that regardless of which particular employees may
have received Alcatel-Lucent’s bribes, “corruption at ICE was pervasive in
the tender process and occurred at the highest reaches of ICE” such that
awarding the agency victim status “would undermine the meaning and

255. Crime Victim Rights’ Act of 2004 (“CVRA”), Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2261 (2004)
(codified as amended at 18 USC § 3771 (2006)). The CVRA was preceded by the Victims’ Rights and
Restitution Act of 1990 (“VRRA”), Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat 4820 (1990) (codified at 42 USC
§ 10606 (2000)), repealed by CVRA, 118 Stat. at 2264.
256. CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e).
257. See United States v. Cummings, 189 F. Supp. 2d 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding corporation
entitled to restitution for losses sustained when it was required to file restated financial statements after
a partner manipulated the corporation’s financial records).
258. United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that restitution to the university
was appropriate in the prosecution of a dean and a state senator for honest services fraud and bribery
wherein the senator’s agreement with the university caused it to suffer a financial loss of over
$2 million).
259. United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that because police
cars and condominium property were damaged during a police chase after a bank robbery, the
damages sustained by the condominium association were a direct and proximate result of the bank
robbery).
260. United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2002) (awarding to State); United States v.
Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2004) (awarding to Medicare); United States v. Donaby, 349 F.3d
1046 (7th Cir. 2003) (awarding to a police department); United States v. Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862
(8th Cir. 2006) (awarding to the IRS).
261. Petition for Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, United States v.
Alcatel-Lucent France, SA, 688 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-12716, 11-12802) [hereinafter
“Alcatel-Lucent Writ”].
262. Id.
263. Id.
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purpose behind these victim rights.”264 Indeed, both the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit agreed that
the government agency was more accurately understood as a coconspirator than a victim.265
Because this systemic and high-reaching corruption is undoubtedly
typical of the government agencies in the developing countries where
nearly all FCPA enforcement actions occur, the victims compensation
statutes are bound to fail. Trying to identify the “victim” as the
government agency that employed the bribe solicitors would thus seem an
inherently doomed approach. The communities that these agencies purport
to serve are the victims, not the agencies themselves; indeed, the
communities are victims in large part because their governments serve
them so poorly. Likely for this reason, the DOJ’s usage of the restitution
remedy, while not unprecedented, has been practically nonexistent. Since
the modern enforcement era began roughly ten years ago, the DOJ has
only awarded restitution damages once, where the victim was the United
States government itself266 rather than the developing countries in which
FCPA enforcement actions almost invariably occur.267
One might imagine, alternatively, that non-governmental, communitybased organizations could better represent the victims of bribery, but this
too will fall short of the victims’ rights statutes. The inherent problem with
deeming such community-based organizations as victims under these
statutes is that the organizations are not themselves the victims. They
would merely represent the victims. But the statutes require compensation
directly to the victims, making no provision for awarding restitution to
groups who advocate on the victims’ behalf. Though U.S. courts have
deemed some non-governmental organizations victims under the statutes,
these organizations were themselves the victims and had suffered direct
and measureable harm: a neighborhood association received restitution
from a bank robbery because the robbery damaged association property;268
a university received restitution from a dean and state senator for honest

264. Government’s Response to Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad of Costa Rica’s Petition
for Victim Status and Restitution at 7, Alcatel-Lucent, 688 F.3d 1301.
265. In re Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, No. 11-12708-G, at 2 (11th Cir. June 17, 2011)
(citing U.S. v. Lazarenko, 624 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2010)), available at http://www.mediafire.
com/?turaenl 2l0ppdz6.
266. United States v. Juan Diaz, No. 1:09-cr-20346-JEM (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2012).
267. In its more distant history, the U.S. awarded restitution two other times. See United States v.
F.G. Mason Eng’g, B-90-29-JAC (D. Conn. Nov. 15,1990); United States v. Kenny Int’l Corp., 79CR-372 (D.C.C. Aug. 2, 1979). But again, those enforcement actions did not occur in developing
countries; the victim governments were Germany and New Zealand (Cook Islands), respectively.
268. United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2006).
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services fraud where the senator’s agreement with the university caused it
to suffer a substantial financial loss;269 a corporation’s stock dropped after
restating its financials following the discovery of accounting fraud;270 and
an insurance company was compensated for duplicative bills it paid.271
These precedents are qualitatively different from bribery: the organizations
were the victims, not merely the victims’ representatives. Because these
statutes require a showing of “direct and proximate” harm to a discrete
person or group of persons, they are inherently ill-suited to provide
restitution to the victims of bribery.
A second strategy, developed by a Nigerian NGO, proposed
compensating community organizations not through victims’ rights
statutes but through the reallocation of disgorged profits. The SocioEconomic Rights and Accountability Project (“SERAP)272 sent a letter to
the SEC273 in March of 2012 proposing this remedy on a case-by-case
basis. Disgorgement requires corporations to forfeit the amount of “illgotten gain” from bribery,274 deriving from principles of restitution
whereby “a person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of
another is required to make restitution to the other.”275 Although the FCPA
contains no express disgorgement provision, beginning in 2004276 the SEC
drew on its broader disgorgement authority277 to make the remedy a
regular feature of FCPA enforcement actions.278
Similarly, Matthew Turk has proposed directing disgorged profits from
FCPA actions to the governments of the countries in which the bribery

269. United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2011).
270. United States v. Cummings, 189 F. Supp. 2d 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
271. United States v. Lisa, 152 Fed. Appx. 85 (2d Cir. 2005).
272. See SERAP, http://serap-nigeria.org/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
273. See Alexander W. Sierck, African NGO Asks For Distribution Of FCPA Recoveries, THE
FCPA BLOG (Mar. 16, 2012, 3:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/3/16/african-ngo-asksfor-distribution-of-fcpa-recoveries.html (link to the letter from Alexander Sierck to Robert S.
Khuzami, Dir. of the SEC Enforcement Division included in blog post).
274. See Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 325 (2013).
275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § I (1937) (“Unjust Enrichment”). See also Turk,
supra note 274, at 14–16.
276. See SEC v. ABB Ltd., No. 1:04-cv-01141 (D.D.C. 2004).
277. For a discussion of the SEC’s disgorgement authority and its uneasy relationship to the
FCPA, see David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits,
and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and
Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 478 (2009); see also Turk, supra note 274, at 12–14.
278. See Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA
Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.shearman.com/en/news
insights/publications/2009/10/recent-trends-and-patterns-in-fcpa-enforcement.
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occurred.279 Noting that FCPA disgorgement has deposited over $1 billion
directly in the U.S. Treasury,280 he suggests using those funds instead to
enhance local anti-bribery enforcement to “restrict the demand-side of
corruption.”281 Where the local governments are too corrupt to be trusted
with these monies, Turk proposes depositing the funds with the OECD
Working Group282 to improve its efforts to monitor implementation of the
OECD Convention.283
Although the SEC replied to the disgorgement proposal with a polite
but noncommittal letter,284 using disgorged profits in this way may at first
blush seem possible under the SEC’s statutory grant of disgorgement
authority. The disgorgement power derives from the 1990 Penny Stock
Reform Act, which amended the 1934 Securities Act.285 This authority
was then modified in 2002 by Sarbanes-Oxley286 to provide the SEC an
alternative use of the disgorged monies. Called the “Fair Fund and
Disgorgement Plan,” it provides that in lieu of being deposited in the U.S.
Treasury, the funds may “become part of a disgorgement fund or other
fund established for the benefit of the victims of such violation.”287 While
the term “victim” as herein used is vague, it would at least conceptually
appear to encompass a fairly broad category of persons whether U.S. or
foreign, legal or natural.

279. Turk, supra note 274, at 45–50.
280. Paul R. Berger et al., Do FCPA Remedies Follow FCPA Wrongs? “Disgorgement” in
Internal Controls and Books Records Cases, 3 FCPA UPDATE, Aug. 2011, at 1, 2, available at
http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/9d56da80-1da1-4e29-bc27-4288643df3cc/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/ea922c2f-78d8-46ea-ad2d-69638418a04e/FCPAUpdateAugust2011.pdf.
281. Turk, supra note 274, at 46.
282. The Working Group gathers information concerning Member States’ compliance with the
convention, which involves country visits by experts from peer governments and meetings with
prosecutors and civil society representatives. OECD Working Group in International Business
Transactions, OECD (2012), http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-bribery
convention/oecdworkinggrouponbriberyininternationalbusinesstransactions.htm. See also Daniel K.
Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA.
J. INT’L L. 665, 679 (2004).
283. Turk, supra note 274, at 58–62.
284. Benjamin Kessler, Giving Back To The Victims, THE FCPA BLOG (May 2, 2012, 1:53 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/5/2/giving-back-to-the-victims.html (link to the letter from
Robert S. Khuzami to Alexander W. Sierck included in blog post) (“We appreciate your thoughtful
submission, and will give appropriate consideration to your suggestions.”).
285. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101429, §§ 202(a), 203, 104 Stat. 931 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u-3(e) (2000)). Prior to 1990,
the SEC’s disgorgement authority derived from case law. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec.,
Inc., 547 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978).
286. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
287. Penny Stock Act, 15 USC § 7246(a).
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However, the current regulations interpreting this term prohibit
returning disgorged profits to the victims, and in so doing illustrate the
inherent limitations of SEC disgorgement.288 The SEC has interpreted
“victim” in its regulations to refer exclusively to investors: where the
original statute provides that the fund be established for “the benefit of the
victims,” the regulation now reads “for the benefit of the investors.” 289
This approach is appropriate to securities law generally, in which the
shareholders are typically the victims. But as other scholars have pointed
out, investors in bribe-paying countries are not quite victimized by
bribery; indeed, they typically profit from the ill-gotten gains, and are
financially harmed only by the resulting enforcement action.290 Likely for
this reason, the Fair Fund has not been used in FCPA enforcement.
Although the regulation could in principle be amended to define
victims more broadly, the regulation’s wording is merely reflective of the
SEC’s broader mission, which is to “protect investors.”291 As the Supreme
Court has recently emphasized, the SEC’s statutory authority extends only
to U.S. markets and its investors.292 The principle that the securities laws
should aim to improve the social conditions of the citizens in developing
countries would have collateral implications for a great many areas of
securities law; in effect, it would require redefining and reorganizing an
agency. For this reason the disgorgement remedy, much like the victims
rights strategy, is ill-suited to anti-bribery law.
For a fully viable third option we can look to another area of federal
law enforcement, environmental law, in which the proceeds of corporate
enforcement actions are regularly used to compensate victims. As part of
the settlement of an enforcement action with the EPA, violators may
voluntarily agree to perform a project to benefit the environment.293 The
cost of the project is then used to reduce the monetary penalty that would
otherwise apply; the amount of penalty mitigation is based on the cost of

288. See Turk, supra note 274, at 16.
289. 17 C.F.R. § 201.1100 (2006).
290. See, e.g., David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and
Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 478 (2009); Turk, supra note 274, at 18.
291. See generally The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov (follow
“About Us” link) (last visited Aug. 21, 2014).
292. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
293. See Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEP) Policy, EPA.GOV (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://www.epa.gov/region2/p2/sep.htm.
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the project and several other factors.294 These projects are neither required
nor prohibited by federal statute; they are solely the creatures of
prosecutorial discretion. Neither do the victims go to court to compel this
form of restitution; it is a voluntary agreement between the enforcement
agencies, the defendant, and the organizations that will carry out the
environmental project and thus receive the funds. In civil enforcement,
these projects are called Supplemental Environmental Projects (“SEPs”),
and on the criminal side, they are known as supplemental sentences or
simply as community service.295
This approach to settling federal enforcement actions recently reached
its zenith in the case against BP for the Gulf of Mexico spill. Resulting in
the single largest criminal resolution in U.S. history, with a $4.0 billion
criminal recovery,296 the resolution is structured so that more than half of
this recovery will fund SEPs to compensate those communities and
ecosystems most directly harmed by the spill. As the government’s own
press release explained, approximately $2.4 billion of the $4.0 billion
criminal recovery is dedicated to acquiring, restoring, preserving and
conserving—in consultation with appropriate state and other resource
managers—the marine and coastal environments, ecosystems and bird and
wildlife habitat in the Gulf of Mexico and bordering states harmed by the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. This portion of the criminal recovery will
also be directed to significant barrier island restoration and/or river
diversion off the coast of Louisiana to further benefit and improve coastal
wetlands affected by the oil spill. An additional $350 million will be used
to fund improved oil spill prevention and response efforts in the Gulf
through research, development, education and training.297 The money is
going primarily to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation that,
contrary to its misleading name, is actually an independent, non-profit

294. These factors include: how effectively it benefited the public or the environment, whether it
was innovative, what (if any) input exists from the affected community, and whether issues of
environmental justice were relevant in a given case. Id.
295. Kris Dighe, Organizational Community Service in Environmental Crimes Cases, 60 U.S.
ATTY’S BULL., July 2012, at 100, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/
usab6004.pdf.
296. Kiley Kroh, Breaking Down the BP Settlement: Where Will the Money Go?,
THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Nov. 16, 2012, 9:19 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/11/16/120282/
breaking-down-the-bp-settlement-where-will-the-money-go/.
297. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead
Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding
Deepwater Horizon Incident (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-ag1369.html.
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conservation group.298 An additional $350 million will go to the National
Academy of Sciences for oil spill prevention, education, research, and
training.299 In addition to the sheer size, this criminal settlement is historic
in its dedication of the majority of funds to the affected communities for
environmental restoration.300
The environmental model could be easily adapted to the anti-bribery
context to compensate victims. Supplemental sentences have historically
been used for a wide array of purposes, including improving public health,
preventing or reducing pollution, performing environmental restoration
and protection, performing a self-assessment or audit to identify potential
improvements to environmental performance, and providing training or
technical support to other members of the community to improve
environmental compliance. The EPA requires the project to improve,
protect, or reduce risks to the environment or public health and that the
project be closely connected to the violation.301 Similarly, as part of the
terms of an FCPA settlement, the DOJ and SEC could require companies
to set aside a substantial portion of the criminal penalties to fund local
organizations. These organizations would use the funds to restore and
protect the rights of the communities in which the bribes occurred. The
particular uses of the funds would depend on the nature of the bribes.
Where, for example, safety regulations were circumvented in the
construction of public buildings, local organizations could fund and
monitor safety assessments and improvements. Where public health
officials were bribed, organizations could again fund and monitor
inspections and remedial measures. Where environmental regulations were
violated, these organizations could function similarly to those in the BP

298. Guilty Plea Agreement at 16, U.S. v. BP Exploration & Prod. Inc., Civ. Action No. 2:10-cv04536 (E.D. La. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/43320121115143613
990027.pdf.
299. Id.
300. Kroh, supra note 296. Additional forms of restitution are anticipated. In June 2012, Congress
took the unusual step of passing the RESTORE Act, which requires eighty percent of civil fines under
the Clean Water Act to be used for community restoration in the Gulf States. While the Clean Water
Act civil settlement has not yet been reached, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the DOJ
will seek the maximum penalty, which could be as high as $21 billion. Kroh, supra note 296.
Additionally, beyond the $4 billion criminal recovery, an additional “criminal fine” of $1.25 billion
will be allocated to Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and North American Wetlands Conservation Fund
pursuant to specific statutory sections. Criminal Guilty Plea, supra note 298, at 4.
301. Supplemental Environmental Project (SEPs) Library, EPA.GOV (May 9, 2014), http://www.
epa.gov/region1/enforcement/sep/index.html. The EPA also requires that the SEP be voluntary; it
cannot have been committed to or started before the EPA identified the violation; the EPA may not
have any role in managing the SEP or its funding; the specific SEP must be memorialized in a signed
agreement; and the SEP may not increase any federal agency’s resources to perform activities that are
already legally required of those agencies. Id.
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Gulf of Mexico settlement and fund environmental restoration and training
for prevention. All such measures would plainly help to improve the
conditions of those communities that were damaged by systemic corporate
bribery and, in doing so, enable the FCPA to achieve its purpose of
promoting and protecting rights.
Indeed, there actually exists a little-known precedent in FCPA history
for using monies collected from enforcement actions to fund local
organizations in the host country. The enforcement action of 2002 that
heralded the beginning of the modern enforcement era concerned James
Giffen, a U.S. attorney who bribed officials in Kazakhstan on behalf of
U.S. oil companies. In settling the case, the United States arranged with
officials in Kazakhstan and Switzerland to release the $80 million in
alleged bribes from their Swiss accounts and establish a trust fund.302 That
fund now finances a Kazakh NGO called the BOTA Foundation, whose
purpose is to “improve the lives of children, youth and their families
suffering from poverty in Kazakhstan through investment in their health,
education and social welfare.”303
BOTA has three specific programs funded by the recovered bribes: a
conditional cash transfer program, which gives funds directly to eligible
poor families to increase access to health, education, and social welfare
services; a social services program, with makes grants to local and
international NGOs to promote early childhood development, special
needs services, and benefits to orphans and other severely disadvantaged
children; and a tuition assistance program, which provides college and
vocational education scholarships.304 The fund’s board of trustees includes
several Kazakhstani academics and professionals, and government
representatives from the U.S. and Switzerland; it does not include any
Kazakhstani government officials. The Giffen case is slightly different
from what this Article proposes: BOTA is funded with recovered bribes,
not with criminal penalties. Still, it may be understood as setting an
important, if underappreciated, precedent: the recognition that bribery’s
victims should, and can, be compensated through funding community
organizations.
While this Part has focused on the compensation of victims in
developing countries, some have proposed compensating a second group
302. Michael Steen, Kazakh “Oil Bribe” Millions to Go to Poor Children, REUTERS (May 4,
2007, 7:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/05/04/idUSL04489030.
303. See THE BOTA FOUND., http://www.bota.kz/en/index.php/pages/index/1 (last visited Aug. 21,
2014).
304. Id.
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of victims: compliant companies who lose business to bribe-payors from
foreign jurisdictions. The environmental model could perhaps make some
progress in this regard by funding local watchdog organizations who
might conduct the kind of investigative reporting that exposed Wal-Mart,
and expose the bribe paying of other companies. Such exposure works,
however, only when the company’s home jurisdiction will enforce its
extraterritorial bribery prohibitions. And at present, few do. A more
effective long-term strategy would require some kind of legal mechanism,
stronger than most foreign jurisdictions’ anti-bribery enforcement regimes,
to hold foreign companies liable.
A Democratic Congressman from Colorado has introduced a
provocative bill305 in multiple congressional sessions that would create a
private right of action under the FCPA. It grants the right to persons who
are already subject to FCPA jurisdiction and proposes that these actions be
brought only against persons who are not subject to FCPA jurisdiction.
The bill states that only “foreign concerns” (a term that does not appear in
the FCPA) may be liable, and defines a foreign concern as “any person
other than” those subject to FCPA jurisdiction.306 The plaintiff would have
to prove essentially three elements: (1) that the foreign person made a
payment otherwise proscribed under the FCPA; (2) that the payment
“prevented the plaintiff from obtaining or retaining business for or with
any person; and (3) that the payment “assisted the foreign concern in
obtaining or retaining business.”307 Damages would be three times either
the value of the business that the defendant gained, by virtue of the bribe,
or the value of the business that the plaintiff lost due to the bribe.308
Whatever political opposition the bill may be encountering (it has
never made it out of committee),309 it suffers from a more fundamental
problem. It could not meaningfully address the business community’s
basic objection to FCPA enforcement: the absence of a level playing

305. Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 3531, 112th Cong. (2011). See also
Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009, H.R. 2152, 111th Cong. (2009); Foreign Business
Bribery prohibition Act of 2008, H.R. 6188, 110th Cong. (2008).
306. H.R. 3531, supra note 305, § 2.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See H.R. 3531 Bill Summary & Status, THE LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d112:HR03531:@@@X (last visited Aug. 21, 2014); H.R. 2152 Bill Summary &
Status, THE LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02152:@@@X
(last visited Aug. 21, 2014); H.R. 6188 Bill Summary & Status, THE LIBR. OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR06188:@@@X (last visited Aug. 21, 2014).
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field.310 Private enforcement in U.S. courts, initiated by companies that
could prove loss, and brought against only those foreign companies with
sufficient ties to establish personal jurisdiction here, could never suffice to
create an effective global anti-bribery enforcement regime. It could never
neutralize the black knights. This problem could only be remedied by
developing a mechanism for pressuring other capital-exporting nations to
enforce their own laws. But that problem has arisen before, and we have
begun developing ways to solve it.
C. Pursuing Global Enforcement by Following the Precedent of
Intellectual Property
The most effective remedy to the black knight problem is precisely the
remedy we sought to an analogous problem in intellectual property: an
amendment to the World Trade Organization agreements. This Article
proposes an anti-bribery amendment that would function exactly as the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement (“TRIPS”)
functions now. We should begin with a caveat: this reform is quite plainly
easier said than done. In the foreseeable future, the realistic chances of
enacting the amendment I describe below are very nearly zero. But at the
conceptual level, the idea has merit; as this Part will show, the parallels
between intellectual property and anti-bribery law are striking. Intellectual
Property and anti-bribery law have followed parallel historical trajectories,
bringing anti-bribery to precisely the place now that IP was in the 1980s
just prior to ratification of the WTO. Specifically, the current state of
global anti-bribery enforcement, in which companies from non-enforcing
countries are able to exploit the vulnerabilities of companies from IPenforcing nations, is precisely the problem that gave rise to TRIPS.
The failures of the current U.S. approach to solving the black knight
problem illustrate all too well why we must look elsewhere. The OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention of 1997311 obligates members to enforce FCPAtype laws. Though it has made only incremental progress,312 criticizing the
organization on these grounds is short-sighted; little steps are to be
expected from a multinational organization. Rather, the OECD
Convention suffers from two inherent problems that time is unlikely to

310. See, e.g., Regulations: Restoring Balance, USCHAMBER.COM, http://www.uschamber.com/
regulations (last visited Aug. 21, 2014).
311. OECD Convention, supra note 144.
312. OECD Progress Report, OECD.ORG (May 18, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/tax/harmfultax
practices/43606256.pdf.
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resolve. First, though OECD membership did at one time encompass all
the major capital-exporters—the United States, the western European
nations, and Japan, among others—this is no longer true. The recent rise of
China, India, and the emerging economies generally renders the OECD
worldview obsolete; many such countries, including China and India, are
not members, and are not going to be. The OECD, then, is powerless to
neutralize the black knights. But even if it could—even if the OECD were
a worldwide organization that included all major capital-exporters—the
convention would still suffer from a second, and probably fatal, flaw: it
lacks a dispute mechanism. That is, compliant nations have no means of
holding noncompliant nations accountable. Anti-bribery law thus cannot
begin to become effective without two components: (1) enactment within
an international organization that includes all major capital exporters; and
(2) an effective interstate complaint procedure.
While another existing convention can solve the membership problem,
it cannot solve the dispute mechanism problem. The U.N.’s Convention
Against Corruption (“UNCAC”)313 now has 160 parties, including all the
major capital exporters, and specifically includes an international bribery
prohibition.314 Though enacted ten years ago, it has had minimal impact on
deterring international corporate bribery. Its standards are notoriously
vague: contrary to the FCPA and OECD Convention which specifically
define the prohibited conduct, UNCAC merely requires that each state
“adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary” to stop
bribery.315 This vagueness is likely the result of seeking consensus among
160 parties in a convention that defines not just bribery (as the FCPA and
OECD do) but all manner of corrupt acts, including such difficult-todefine concepts as “trading in influence” or “abuse of functions.”316 But
more fundamentally, UNCAC has no interstate complaint procedure. Even
if its substantive requirements were sufficiently specific that
noncompliance could be defined, imposing sanctions for noncompliance is
virtually impossible.317

313. UNCAC, supra note 122.
314. Id.
315. Id. art. 15.
316. Id. art. 19.
317. One can imagine using the International Court of Justice as a dispute resolution mechanism
for UNCAC. Because the ICJ requires both parties to a dispute to consent to the forum’s jurisdiction,
nations could either consent ad hoc or UNCAC could be amended to establish compulsory jurisdiction
in the ICJ. But until UNCAC defines the prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity that
noncompliance could ever be identified, ICJ jurisdiction would do little good. The International
Criminal Court might eventually be used to prosecute grand corruption, but it would likely require a
showing that the corruption constituted a “crime against humanity,” a standard that few, if any, acts of
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But history has already taught us how to address the problem through
the development of intellectual property law. The U.S. intellectual
property regime emerged in the late eighteenth and mid nineteenth
centuries: the Patent Act318 and the Copyright Act319 were enacted in 1790,
and the first federal trademark law320 came in 1870. These federal statutes
were largely designed to afford domestic protections to U.S. persons for
violations occurring within U.S. territory. They were gradually revised and
expanded, and resources were increasingly devoted to their enforcement
through the nineteenth century. But as the Industrial Revolution led to
more worldwide economic and technological growth, competitor firms
proliferated. Seeking to protect U.S. firms from overseas violations that
were beyond the scope of existing domestic law, the U.S. became part of
the movement that would result in the ratification of the first major
international intellectual property convention: the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, enacted in 1883.321 The Convention
created minimum substantive and procedural standards for the protection
of various IP rights in patents, trademarks, trade names, and trade
secrets.322 The Convention also created an organization of member nations
called the Paris Union, which would meet periodically to discuss
compliance with and amendments to the Convention. The Convention
would spawn myriad other regional conventions to supplement its
coverage, creating an overlapping network of international conventions
designed to bring rival nations within a common IP legal regime.323
corruption could satisfy. See, e.g., Mara Theophila, Note, “Moral Monsters” Under the Bed: Holding
Corporations Accountable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859 (2011).
318. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
319. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
320. Trademark Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
321. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat.
1372, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter “Paris Convention”]. The U.S. was not among the original eleven
signatories, but joined the Paris Convention four years later, in 1887. See L. Kamran Bilir et al., Do
Treaties Encourage Technology Transfer? Evidence from the Paris Convention 1, 4 (Working Paper,
July 22, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1893052.
322. These included patents, trademarks, trade names, and trade secrets. See Paris Convention,
supra note 321, arts. 4–11. A separate convention, the Berne Convention, would cover copyrights. The
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 331 U.N.T.S. 217
[hereinafter “Berne Convention”]. Though enacted in 1886, the U.S. would not join the Berne
Convention until 1989. Deborah Ross, Comment, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New
Obligations for Authors’ Moral Rights?, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363, 363–65 (1990).
323. See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891,
828 U.N.T.S. 389 (revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague
on Nov. 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Nice on June 15, 1957, and at Stockholm on July 14,
1967, and amended on Oct. 2, 1979); Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of
Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June 15, 1957, S. EXEC. DOC. E.,
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Despite the existence of the Paris Union, the Paris Convention created
no transnational enforcement mechanism; it called on member nations to
develop and implement their own domestic statutory protections.324 A
decade of experience would demonstrate the inadequacy of this
approach.325 Finding that local enforcement was uneven and unreliable, the
developed countries concluded that they could no longer rely on domestic
enforcement, even when supposedly required by international convention.
Accordingly, they sought to create a supplemental international
enforcement mechanism by which nations could be held accountable for
their failure to uphold convention obligations. This concern became
sufficiently pronounced in the early 1980s that the United States placed IP
on the agenda for the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.326 The link
between international trade and IP was not immediately obvious at that
time; one scholar noted that it “calls for explanation” given that IP is
nowhere mentioned in the WTO’s founding document, the GATT of
1947.327 Still, a strong argument for the link between IP and trade, and
aggressive lobbying efforts, eventually produced the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which entered
into effect in 1995 along with the other WTO agreements.
The substantive IP protections required by TRIPS are substantially
similar to those of the predecessor Paris Convention; TRIPS calls for only
slightly heightened protections.328 Moreover, TRIPS’ minimum standards
do not require absolute uniformity across jurisdictions; for example,
TRIPS allows the U.S. to continue using a first-to-invent criterion for
priority in patent applications when the rest of the world uses a first-to-file
system.329 But TRIPS’ most significant contribution to worldwide IP
protection does not lie in the substantive standards. Rather, the
contribution is two-fold. First, it requires all WTO members to meet
minimum enforcement obligations. As one scholar noted, “it is [no longer]

96-1, 1154 U.N.T.S. 89 (1979); World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty,
Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M 65 (1997).
324. Paris Convention, supra note 321, art. 1.
325. See, e.g., Gustavo Bravo, From Paris Convention to TRIPs: A Brief History, 12 J. CONTEMP.
ISSUES 445 (2001).
326. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND
POLICY 697 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter MATSUSHITA].
327. See id. at 696. For a critical view of the link between IP and trade, see R. Michael Gadbaw,
Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of Convenience?, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 223 (1989).
328. MATSUSHITA, supra note 326, at 698.
329. Id. at 704. The United States has recently adopted the first to file system. See LeahySmith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 257).
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enough to enact laws protecting IP by minimum standards; WTO member
states must enforce their laws” according to TRIPS’ requirements.330 But
even that, standing alone, would be rather insignificant absent TRIPS’
second important contribution: the availability of the WTO dispute
resolution process to states who wish to bring actions against other states
for failure to uphold protection obligations.331
This system, what one scholar calls “arguably the most important
international tribunal,”332 functions much like an international court:
jurisdiction is compulsory, disputes are resolved through application of
settled rules of law, findings are appealable, decisions are binding on the
parties, and non-compliance with settlements is sanctionable.333 TRIPS’
dispute resolution methods thus “put significant teeth” in national IP
enforcement.334 The U.S. has brought multiple actions against China in
particular.335 More generally, the procedure has become a mechanism in
which WTO members, particularly the United States, have pressured
China to more effectively enforce IP protections through imposing
heightened criminal penalties, more aggressive civil and administrative
enforcement, more equal treatment among domestic and foreign rights
holders, etc.336 Though historically China was slow to respond to WTO
pressures,337 commentators have noted a general upward trend in Chinese
IP protections.338
And today, IP rights are increasingly regarded as international human
rights. Article 27 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states, “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material

330. AARON FELLMETH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 45 (2d ed.
2009).
331. MATSUSHITA, supra note 326, at 734.
332. Id. at 104.
333. Id.
334. Bravo, supra note 325, at 5.
335. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007); Request for
Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/1 (Apr. 16,
2007).
336. See, e.g., Konstantina K. Athanasakou, China IPR Enforcement: Hard as Steel or Soft as
Tofu? Bringing the Question to the WTO Under TRIPS, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 217 (2007).
337. Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China’s Capacity to Implement World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 399, 423
(2002) (explaining that China’s failure to comply with the laws of the WTO may make dispute
resolution impossible).
338. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Rise And Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34
CAMPBELL L. REV. 525 (2012); Natalie P. Stoianoff, The Influence of the WTO Over China’s
Intellectual Property Regime, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 65 (2012).
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interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author.”339 Similarly, the 1966 International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that,
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits
of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.340
United States anti-bribery law has followed a similar trajectory and
should continue to follow it. At the time of enactment in 1977, the U.S.
was not particularly concerned about rival industrialized nations; the
United States still enjoyed substantial economic hegemony, and thus
Congress unilaterally enacted a bribery prohibition without much regard
for whether other countries would do so.341 But as competitors emerged in
other countries, the United States recognized that it was losing business to
companies whose countries did not enforce bribery prohibitions. Just as
the United States participated in the creation of the Paris Convention and
the Paris Group, the United States lobbied the developed countries through
the OECD to implement and enforce similar laws.342 These laws were, by
design, to be enforced as domestic law by national governments,343 just as
IP laws were under the Paris Convention. The OECD convention created
no international enforcement mechanism. Unsurprisingly, the empirical
data would show that the OECD Convention has failed to level the
proverbial playing field; many OECD nations fail to honor their
obligations under the Anti-Bribery Convention and many other capital
exporters are not parties to the convention. Anti-bribery law is thus now
where IP once was: the need for global enforcement is plain, and
experience has taught344 that this will not be achieved without an interstate
complaint procedure.
A TRIPS-like anti-bribery provision could establish standards of
protection that are high, but that take into account differences between

339. UDHR, supra note 113, art. 27.
340. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3. See also Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121; Peter K.
Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1039 (2007).
341. Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 17, at 355–62.
342. Id.; Spalding, Four Unchartered Corners, supra note 18, at 662.
343. OECD Convention, supra note 144, art. 4, cmt. paras. 25–26.
344. See OECD Progress Report, supra note 312.
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countries on such fundamental legal issues as corporate criminal liability
or the use of deferred prosecution agreements. It could also establish
benchmarks of effective enforcement, as TRIPS does. But most
importantly, it could subject the bribery provisions to the dispute
settlement provisions, as TRIPS did. In doing so, it would create the first
forum in which all capital exporters could bring complaints against other
nations for failure to enforce extraterritorial bribery prohibitions. Creating
an anti-bribery annex to the WTO agreements thus has unique potential to
neutralize black knights.
Moreover, anti-bribery law is substantially immune from the principal
objection to TRIPS specifically and the global IP regime generally. While
many argue that TRIPS benefits wealthy countries at the expense of
developing countries, particularly in relation to pharmaceuticals,345 no
such push back exists in anti-bribery law. Though developing countries
fail to honor obligations by failing to enforce their anti-bribery statutes,
they generally do not object to the international conventions at the level of
principle. The dichotomy between the interests of wealthy nations and
developing nations that now plagues IP law would, in the anti-bribery
context, completely collapse.
And we have long forgotten that a progression of this sort—starting
with a U.S. statute, and then ultimately incorporating extraterritorial
bribery prohibitions into the world trade regime to achieve global
enforcement—was actually envisioned in the earliest days of U.S.
deliberations. In 1975, two years before ultimate enactment of the FCPA,
a resolution was introduced in the U.S. Senate calling for supplementing
any U.S. statute with a multilateral agreement of some kind. The
resolution stated that
the [President’s] Special Representative for Trade Negotiations . . .
and appropriate officials of the Departments of State, Commerce,
the Treasury, . . . and Justice . . . initiate at once negotiations . . .
with the intent of developing . . . specific trading obligations among
governments, together with suitable procedures for the settlement of
disputes, which would result in elimination of [bribery] on an
international, multilateral basis, including suitable sanctions to cope
with problems posed by nonparticipating nations, such codes and
written obligations to become part of the international system of

345. MATSUSHITA, supra note 326, at 708.
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rules and obligations within the framework of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.346
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), of course, is the
precursor to the WTO. The resolution passed by a vote of 93–0. More
specifically, President Ford’s Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Domestic and International Business, Travis Reed, was even more
prescient. He proposed, specifically, introducing anti-bribery laws to the
world’s capital exporters in two steps: first, through the OECD, which
could start the process of achieving agreement among the capital exporters
on the specific provisions of a global bribery provision, and once the
contours of the appropriate legal regime had been worked out, it “could
then be introduced into GATT.”347 But the proposal did not gain
momentum in Congress, and admittedly, it would probably not gain
momentum within the WTO today.
Still, the parallels are striking. We have enacted a U.S. statute and,
through the OECD, refined the template and introduced the statute to
many of the world’s capital exporters. But just as the Ford Administration
foresaw, we now need “suitable sanctions to cope with problems posed by
nonparticipating nations” and “suitable procedures for the settlement of
disputes.”348 The IP experience confirms our original hunch that the WTO
can serve precisely this function. Moreover, the proposal would appeal to
both sides of the political aisle, both here and abroad: liberals would
herald the extension of our human rights regime, while conservatives
would celebrate leveling the playing field. Conceptually, the idea’s time
has come; perhaps one day it will come practically as well.
CONCLUSION
At a recent judicial conference, Chief Justice Roberts famously
disparaged legal scholarship for its alleged irrelevance to practice. He
remarked, “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first
article is likely to be . . . of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but
[not] much help . . . to the bar.”349 But in his sympathy for the bar and

346. S. Res. 265, 94th Cong. (1975).
347. Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On Int’l Trade of the S. Comm. On Fin., 94th Cong. 35 (1975) (statement of Travis Reed, Assistant
U.S. Sec’y of Commerce, Domestic & Int’l Bus. Admin.). See also Koehler, supra note 44, at 982–84.
348. See S. Res. 265.
349. See Mike Sacks, Journal Unbound, GEO. L.J. ONLINE, http://georgetownlawjournal.org/ipsaloquitur/the-first-one/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2014); see also Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An
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bench, the Chief Justice neglected to mention a third and arguably more
important category: the actors whose conduct the law seeks to govern.
Academics need not lament the contraction of the ATS; the majority of
multinational corporations will scarcely notice the change at all. Rather,
our efforts to construct a regime of corporate liability for overseas human
rights violations are best refocused on the already-sound footing of antibribery law. Reframed as an issue of human rights, anti-bribery can
become that which Congress first expected it to be, and which the ATS
might have been: an effective instrument for ensuring that multinational
companies comply with, and promote, democratic values across the
developing world.
Empirical Assessment Of The Supreme Court’s Use Of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995,
996 (2012).
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